Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant.

Argument: In the decision that precipitated the “unanimous verdict” issue here, Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020), NACDL (among others) filed an amicus brief. NACDL’s interest in this issue continues because members of our Armed Forces tried by courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ] are not second-class citizens and do not forfeit their Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to a unanimous verdict upon donning a military uniform. Pursuant to CAAF Rule 26(b), our amicus curiae brief “bring[s] relevant matter to the attention of the Court not already brought to its attention by the parties...” NACDL’s approach is different regarding the substantive issue, i.e., does the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous verdict in a criminal case, apply to noncapital courts-martial for serious offenses? Alternatively, does the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause require unanimity? Our amicus brief does not duplicate Appellant’s arguments. NACDL takes a different path in arriving at the same conclusion–non-unanimous verdicts in noncapital courts-martial violate the Constitution. NACDL’s position is that Congress, when enacting Article 52(a)(3), UCMJ, provided for non-unanimous verdicts–as in Ramos–by “the concurrence of at least three-fourths of the members present when the vote is taken” –which contravenes what the Constitution commands, viz., a unanimous verdict. Article 52(a)(3), UCMJ, is therefore unconstitutional on its face.

Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant.

Argument: [T]his case raises fundamental constitutional issues implicating Appellant’s right to have his Fifth Amendment right to Brady material and his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process in securing evidence from MAB’s [the complainant] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services [USCIS] Alien File [A-File] produced for an in camera judicial review. That was necessary to protect Appellant’s right to confront his accuser, to include impeaching her at trial. Finally, this case implicates Appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. NACDL is not alleging ineffective assistance of counsel [IAC], but rather that Appellant’s Trial Defense Counsel [TDC] was improperly thwarted by the government’s opposing his request for an immigration law expert to assist the defense, which the military judge denied, as well as access to her A-File.

Amicus Curiae Brief of the Petitioner, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of the Real Party in Interest.
 

Argument: NACDL, as amicus curiae, submits that Article 52(a)(3), UCMJ, which authorizes non-unanimous verdicts by three-fourths of the voting members in a courtmartial for serious offenses, is unconstitutional on its face. First, military law has long recognized that a military accused has a right to “a fair and impartial panel” which is “a matter of due process” under the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Wiesen, 56 M.J. 172, 174 (CAAF 2001). That is because “[i]mpartial court members are the sine qua non for a fair court-martial.” United States v. Modesto, 43 M.J. 315, 318 (CAAF 1995).

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant.

Argument: NACDL’s amicus brief argues that Article 52(a)(3) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 852(a)(3), which permits nonunanimous verdicts by only a three-fourths majority in non-capital courts-martial involving serious offenses, is unconstitutional under Ramos v. Louisiana.  Courts-martial have been considered “judicial” for almost 135 years.  The UCMJ contemplates that the accused must be given a fair trial, and courts have recognized that the test of fairness requires that military rulings on constitutional issues conform to Supreme Court standards unless conditions peculiar to military life require a different rule.  The Sixth Amendment has already been extensively incorporated into our military justice system.  With the exception of unanimous verdicts, servicemembers facing a court-martial for serious offenses receive the core panoply of constitutional trial rights, and the military justice system is none the worse-for-wear as a result.  Contrary to the lower court’s assertion, non-unanimity promotes unlawful command influence, rather than preventing it.  Although Congressional powers are necessarily broad in the area of military affairs, they are not absolute or unlimited.  Whether found under the Due Process Clause or, as Ramos holds, under the Sixth Amendment’s Impartial Jury Clause, the right to a unanimous verdict in a criminal prosecution is constitutionally mandated.  It is the Constitution that controls on this issue, not a provision within the UCMJ.

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of appellant Lt. Cmdr. Matthew M. Diaz.

Argument: Lt. Cmdr. Diaz, a Navy JAG convicted of improper disclosure of classified information did not receive a fair trial because he was precluded from introducing any evidence of his “intent,” “state of mind,” “motive,” “ethical obligations” as an attorney, and “ethical obligations” as a commissioned officer in the Navy. Appellant was precluded from introducing evidence that the information (a list of detainees being held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) was not marked as classified; that he did not know or believe his actions to be illegal; and that his actions were in good faith and consistent with his duties and obligations a lawyer. Excluding this evidence violated his right to a fair trial and right to present a defense. Furthermore, the Military Judge failed to determine whether the “classified information in question was lawfully classified."

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of appellant. 

Argument: The defendant’s confrontation right precludes the use of drug testing lab “litigation packages” and surrogate expert witnesses (witnesses who testify not no first-hand knowledge of the facts, but as to the hearsay reports and opinions of others); admission of the drug test report materials at defendant’s trial pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 803(6) violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him; opinions offered by the prosecution under M.R.E. 703 cannot satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause when the underlying facts or data come from a nontestifying person or entity.

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of appellant.

Argument: Prosecutor’s failure to disclose nontestifying prosecution expert’s opinion that contradicted the prosecution’s theory of the case and also corroborated the defense experts’ opinion and the testimony of the defendant violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Such conduct also is unethical and constitutes perpetration of a fraud upon the tribunal.

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in support of appellant.

Argument: NACDL submits that the Brady violation in this case is not an isolated aberration, but rather is evidence of a systemic problem in military jurisprudence. Military prosecutors have a legal and ethical duty to seek justice, not convictions, and if trial counsel has a bona fide question as to whether or not something is or is not Brady material, it should be submitted to the military judge for resolution. Absent that, then any violation of Brady will be presumed to be prejudicial absent the government’s demonstration to the contrary by the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 

Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Center for Democracy & Technology in Support of Appellant.

Argument: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not prohibit violations of computer use restrictions, such as the restriction at issue. The CFAA was meant to target "hacking," not violations of computer use restrictions. Written, policy-based restrictions on manner of access are restrictions on use. The lower court's broad reading of the CFAA renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. Corporate policies do not provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited. Basing CFAA liability on violations of use restrictions would permit capricious enforcement by prosecutors. This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction under Specification 13 of Charge II.

Brief of Electronic Frontier Foundation and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant

Argument: The lower courts misconstrued the technology at issue. The lower courts misconstrued the CFAA’s purpose and case law. Congress intended the CFAA to target serious computer break-ins. Consistent with Congress’s intent, courts across the country have held that the CFAA does not criminalize violations of computer use policies. Courts adopting the ‘narrow’ interpretation have rejected the lower courts’ theory that written computer use restrictions on how someone accesses information are ‘access’ restrictions. The military judge ignored basic rules of statutory construction. The lower courts’ broad reading of the CFAA renders the statute unconstitutionally vague.