Brief of the National Association of Federal Defenders and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: This case presents the question of the appropriate mens rea requirement for substantive drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 960. Section 960(a), which codifies the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, prohibits “knowingly or intentionally” importing or exporting a controlled substance. Section 960(b), in turn, specifies a series of aggravated offenses—and correspondingly severe punishments—based on the type and quantity of the “controlled substance” involved. See 21 U.S.C. § 960(b). A defendant who imports or distributes 280 grams of crack-cocaine, for instance, faces a mandatory minimum of ten years in prison. Id. § 960(b)(1)(C). A defendant who imports or distributes the same amount of marijuana faces no mandatory minimum and only a five-year statutory maximum. Id. § 960(b)(4) (cross-referencing id. § 841(b)(1)(D)). The question in this case is whether the government can subject a defendant to these escalating mandatory minimums and maximums without proving that he knew which illegal drug he was importing or the quantity of that illegal drug. The answer is no: Courts presume a statutory mens rea requirement applies to “all the material elements of the offense.” Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2019) (internal citation omitted). And any fact that increases the statutory minimum or maximum under Section 960 (or any other statute) is an element of an offense. See Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476–85 (2000). Therefore, defendants must know what drug they were importing before a court can subject them to statutorily increased sentences. See United States v. Collazo, 984 F.3d 1308, 1338 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (Fletcher, J., dissenting).

Coalition letter to Governor Greg Abbott, of Texas, regarding his executive order (GA-13) refusing to allow release of inmates from state detention facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force co-chair E.E. (Bo) Edwards's testimony to the House Judiciary Committee regarding the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (H.R. 1916, 1995) and federal asset forfeiture programs.

Asset Forfeiture Abuse Task Force co-chairs E.E. (Bo) Edwards, David B. Smith, and Richard Troberman's written statement to the House Judiciary Committee regarding the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (H.R. 1916, 1995) and federal asset forfeiture programs.

Coalition letter to House and Senate leadership and Congressional leadership regarding the overreach of federal civil forfeiture and its use before people are convicted of any offense, undermining the presumption of innocence.

Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioners.

Argument: Categorical denials of the right to bail run afoul of due process. Courts have emphasized that pretrial liberty is the norm since U.S. v. Salerno. Hearings to determine whether "the proof is evident or the presumption is great" do not satisfy due process requirements as they violate the presumption of innocence. Arizona's categorical bail denial law is an outlier despite the well-established tradition nationwide of release in noncapital cases. Pretrial detention causes widespread, irreparable, and unnecessary harm.