Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellee Adnan Syed, by Written Consent

Argument: NACDL, with authors from law firm Paul, Weiss, filed an amicus brief in the Appellate Court of Maryland in Young Lee, as Victim’s Representative v. State of Maryland. Adnan Syed, whose criminal case gained notoriety after being chronicled in the podcast Serial, was recently released from prison after the court vacated his conviction upon the prosecution’s recommendation. Mr. Syed had been serving a life sentence for the 1999 murder of his high school classmate Hae Min Lee. The prosecution cited flaws in the conviction, including unreliable cell phone tower data and possible failure to disclose key exculpatory evidence and two new potential suspects in their motion to vacate Syed’s conviction. Even though they were in attendance, the victim’s family has appealed the vacatur for lack of sufficient notice and opportunity to participate. Our amicus brief argues that, while Maryland law expressly grants a victim the right to receive notice of and attend vacatur proceedings, it does not provide a victim the right to be heard at the proceeding. The Maryland General Assembly made a choice to treat vacatur proceedings differently than other proceedings, such as sentencing, where a victim’s right to be heard is expressly granted. Even if Maryland did provide victims the right to be heard at a vacatur hearing, which it does not, that would not mean that victims have the additional right to participate in such hearings by challenging the evidence, as the victim’s family argues. Giving victims the right to challenge evidence or dispute substantive rulings would effectively allow them to usurp the role of prosecutors and violate due process, we argue.

Amici Curiae Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys Association, and the Innocence Network in Support of Appellant.

Argument: In this extraordinary case, the State conceded that it engaged in “intentional, willful, and/or reckless misconduct” to secure the conviction of Jonathan Smith when it suppressed exculpatory evidence, concealed an agreement involving a key witness who closely assisted in the State’s investigation, and repeatedly lied about this misconduct. On remand from this Court, the Attorney General agreed that this egregious and willful misconduct warranted dismissing the charges against Mr. Smith. Giving little if any weight to these concessions, the Court of Special Appeals applied an impossibly high constitutional bar for due process dismissals that is contrary to this Court’s prior opinion in this matter and to standards in other jurisdictions whose rulings the court purported to survey. Rather than sanctioning the State for its misconduct, the ruling allowed the State to retry Mr. Smith as if its misconduct never occurred and gravely minimized the resulting prejudice to Mr. Smith on any retrial. This is not a meaningful sanction to deter prosecutions, such as this one, that are pervaded from their inception by admittedly egregious and willful prosecutorial misconduct. This Court should grant certiorari to address this issue of first impression, and to devise a standard that adequately deters future prosecutorial misconduct.

Brief of Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Public Justice Center, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Maryland Criminal Defense Attorneys’ Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant.

Argument: In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), that an individual’s “unprovoked flight” in a “high-crime area” created sufficient “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity to justify a stop, interrogation, and search of that individual under the framework prescribed in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals interpreted Wardlow as providing that “unprovoked flight from law enforcement in a high-crime area”—by itself—can be enough to trigger such an intrusion. Ct. Spec. App. Op. at 11 (Mar. 24, 2022) (hereinafter, “COSA Op.”). In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Special Appeals acknowledged that a growing number of state and federal courts—following the standard announced in Terry and applied in Wardlow—account for the “reality that Black individuals have no shortage of innocent reasons to flee at the sight of law enforcement.” Id. at 13. But the Court of Special Appeals, “constrained by [its] place in Maryland’s judicial hierarchy,” thought itself powerless to consider that reality in assessing the reasonableness of the detention and search at issue in this case. Id. at 13, 16.

As an initial matter, Wardlow did not expressly adopt a categorical rule that law enforcement is constitutionally permitted to stop and frisk anyone perceived to be fleeing from police in a purportedly “high-crime” area. See People v. Flores, 38 Cal. App. 5th 617, 631 (2019) (rejecting the argument “that ‘flight’ plus ‘high-crime area’ equals reasonable suspicion for a detention,” and confirming that “Wardlow . . . did not make such a bright-line holding”). Indeed, the term “high-crime area” has itself eluded consistent definition. Instead, Wardlow applied Terry’s holistic “reasonable suspicion” standard to the unique facts and circumstances presented. But the Wardlow Court made clear that any reasonable suspicion analysis must be based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior”—a directive that necessarily requires courts to account for societal advances, including evolving social science, over time.

Our understanding of human behavior has progressed dramatically in the twenty years since Wardlow was decided. State and federal courts around the country have relied on an expanding body of empirical evidence to deem unconstitutional under Terry police stops based on a Black individual’s flight in a supposedly “high-crime area.” Consistent with Wardlow’s teaching and that jurisdictional trend, this Court can—and should—take the opportunity to clarify that in Maryland, too, the “commonsense” implication of a Black man’s flight from police is not criminal guilt, but rather an understandable desire to avoid an interaction fraught with fear and distrust. Amici therefore urge the Court to reverse the decision below, and to hold that the mere fact of flight from law enforcement in a “high-crime area” did not, without more, give the officers in this case adequate cause to stop and search the defendant, Mr. Washington.

See the various issues on which NACDL has conducted criminal justice advocacy in Maryland.

NACDL supports legislation to end the automatic charging of youth in adult criminal court.

NACDL advocated for legislation to bolster the due process rights of youth in Maryland.

NACDL letter to Senator Michael Miller in support of legislation to repeal the death penalty in Maryland.

Letter to the Maryland House Judiciary Committee in opposition to HB 839, a proposal to terminate the Public Defender representation of an indigent client immediately after bail review, unless the client remains in custody. 

Recording of Unlocking the Jury Box: How Felony Disenfranchisement Contributes to America's Jury Diversity Problem, a webinar hosted by NACDL for Second Chance Month 2022. 

NACDL letter to Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley in support of legislation to repeal the death penalty.

NACDL letter to Maryland Senate and House of Delegate members in support of SB 276/HB 295, legislation to repeal the death penalty.

NACDL worked with partners to oppose legislation that would have curtailed the right to counsel in Maryland.

NACDL is providing resources regarding the Criminalization of Pregnancy and Reproductive Health to the criminal defense community. Resources are provided without warranty or guarantee. Please consult the laws and rules of your state and local authorities. Please log in to access them. Membership is NOT required.

Maryland laws and regulations are relevant to abortion are below. Note that Maryland does not have any pre-Roe abortion statutes that would permit prosecution of abortion care prior to viability. In addition, Maryland does not have any trigger laws sprang into effect once Roe was overruled. Maryland criminal law specifically excludes any claim of fetal personhood. See Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 2-103.

NACDL supported legislation to end juvenile life without parole sentences in Maryland.