These briefs on a series of questions, including whether the government is required to prove knowledge of drug type and quantity to trigger mandatory minimum and increased maximum sentences in drug cases were filed in the 9^th Circuit by the federal defender and sentencing resource counsel in LA.

The instant Indictment and a companion Indictment accuse 25 people, mostly young, overwhelmingly people of color, and many of them heroin addicts, of a conspiracy conducted essentially by communication through cell phones.

Argument: I am CJA counsel appointed by the Court to represent my client, Defendant Eddie MartinezFigueroa, who has been charged in a multi-defendant Indictment alleging a conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin. I submit this Memorandum in support of the Defendant’s request for a Protective Order to compel the Government to provide discovery and particularization of those electronically recorded intercepts which allegedly involve him directly.

My client is 26 years old and by virtue of a prior drug conviction is facing a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years in prison.

The instant Indictment and a companion Indictment accuse 25 people, mostly young, overwhelmingly people of color, and many of them heroin addicts, of a conspiracy conducted essentially by communication through cell phones. Through a seven month investigation involving the DEA, the New York State Police, the United States Attorney’s Office, and other law enforcement agencies, the Government employed video and personal surveillance, GPS tracking, monitoring of pen registers, and four separate Title III eavesdropping warrants, targeting four different cell phones and capturing both oral and texting communications.

President Lisa Wayne's written statement to the U.S. Sentencing Commission regarding sentencing practices since the U.S. v. Booker decision.

Letter with the National Association of Federal Defenders to members of the Senate regarding concerns for cases in tribal courts as addressed in the proposed Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2012 (S. 1925).

State legislatures and lawmakers in Washington, D.C., should consider passing statutes giving the right to defendants who have served 10 years to request a reconsideration of their sentences in light of their performance in prison and their achievements after being sentenced.

President Lisa Wayne's letter to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security regarding federal sentencing practices and the U.S. Sentencing Commission since the U.S. v. Booker decision.

Second Circuit Decision to Vacate and Remand Based on Sentence Higher than Guidelines for Illegal Reentry into the United States.

Second Circuit Decision to Vacate and Remand Based on Sentence Higher than Guidelines for Illegal Reentry into the United States

Brief of Juvenile Law Center, Loyola Civitas Childlaw Clinic, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant (full list of amici in Appendix A to attached brief).

Argument: U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence demonstrates that the automatic prosecution and mandatory sentencing of certain youth charged with murder as adults is unconstitutional. Under U.S. Supreme Court case law, Illinois’s transfer and mandatory sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they do not allow for individualized sentencing of minors transferred to adult court and convicted of murder. Youth are fundamentally different from adults in constitutionally relevant ways. The Illinois automatic transfer and mandatory sentencing statutes are unconstitutional because they do not permit a sentencing court to consider the individual maturity and degree of culpability of each youth convicted of murder. The U.S. Supreme Court’s “kids are different” jurisprudence is not limited to a particular type of crime, sentence or constitutional provision. Illinois’ statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it subjects youth who were not principally responsible – such as those charged with felony murder or those charged under an accountability theory – to automatic transfer to adult court and mandatory sentencing without a court’s consideration of the constitutionally relevant attributes of adolescence. Illinois’s statutory scheme departs from national norms. Illinois is an outlier because its statutes require certain youth to be tried in adult court based on age and charge alone, without the opportunity for a court to make an individualized determination as to whether juvenile court jurisdiction would be more appropriate based on the youth’s unique degree of culpability and capacity for change and rehabilitation. Public policy and public opinion overwhelmingly opposes the automatic transfer to adult court and mandatory imposition of adult sentences without judicial review of the individual youth’s degree of culpability and amenability to rehabilitation.