Brief of FAMM, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the National Association of Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Trial judges must consider a defendant’s post-sentencing conduct and intervening legal developments when exercising their Section 404 authority to “Impose A Reduced Sentence.” Evidence of post-sentencing conduct and intervening changes in law significantly affects district courts’ exercise of Section 404 sentencing discretion—producing fairer and more appropriate sentences. The text and statutory context of the First Step Act compel consideration of post-sentencing conduct and intervening legal developments.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief of FAMM and NACDL as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: Every branch of government has recognized the profound injustice that resulted from the stacking of sentences imposed pursuant to Section 924(c). Congress finally remedied that wrong in the First Step Act. This Court should grant review to correct an egregious misunderstanding of Congress’s handiwork—and to remove an unnatural limitation on compassionate release that has produced an intractable circuit split. In the alternative, this Court should hold the Petition in abeyance and grant one or more of the other pending petitions that present the same issue.

Brief Amicus Curiae of National Association Of Criminal Defense Lawyers In Support Of Petitioner (on petitioner for a writ of certiorari).

Argument: Timely resolution of the question presented is of great practical importance to First Step Act movants. Appellate-court decisions remanding for considers of the § 3553(a) factors have resulted in significantly reduced sentences. The temporal gap between the original sentencing and First Step Act proceeedings underscores the importance of an update § 3553(a) analysis. In light of the very real possibility that renewed § 3553(a) consideration results in lower sentences, the Court must intervene now.

Brief of Retired Federal Judges, Former Federal Prosecutors, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner. 

Argument: Defendants sentenced for crack cocaine offenses under the pre-2010 version of § 841(b)(1)(C) are eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act of 2018.  The First Step Act’s resentencing provisions apply to offenses whose penalties were “modified” by the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010.  Although defendants sentenced under the pre-2010 version of § 841(b)(1)(C) remain eligible for their original sentences after the statute was recently amended, the sentences they would have received under the post-2010 version of the statute almost certainly would have been lower—likely significantly lower.  That is because the Fair Sentencing Act dramatically expanded the drug quantities to which § 841(b)(1)(C) applies.  All else equal, a sentencing judge generally aims to align the various drug-quantity ranges in § 841(b) with the corresponding sentence ranges—assigning lower sentences for lower quantities and higher sentences for higher quantities.  In other words, the drug-quantity benchmarks in § 841(b) exert a powerful anchoring influence over a judge’s sentencing decisions.  And Congress changed the relevant anchor points 2010.  Thus, it “modified” the statutory penalties in § 841(b)(1)(C), and defendants sentenced under that provision are entitled to resentencing.

Brief of the Federal Public and Community Defenders for the Judicial Districts of the Sixth Circuit and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal.

Argument: The career offender guideline is problematic. The impact of the career offender guidelines was even more severe before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The severity of the career offender guideline does not advance the purposes of sentencing. The career offender guideline has an unwarranted adverse impact on Black defendants. A career offender sentence creates rather than avoids unwarranted disparity in the ordinary case. Courts must take special care when considering the need to avoid unwarranted disparity for those deemed career offenders and eligible for First Step Act relief.

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and FAMM in Support of Defendant/Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Appellee Raia’s Petition for Rehearing addresses the discretion of a district court to excuse the 30-day waiting period for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). On April 2, 2020, the Panel declined to remand this case under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1, stating that remand would be “futile.” In so ruling, the Panel necessarily concluded that the 30-day waiting period cannot be excused or waived. That conclusion was inconsistent with both Supreme Court and Circuit precedent. The ruling creates inconsistency in the Circuit’s treatment of all claims-processing rules, and undermines courts’ equitable authority in a wide range of cases. The30-day waiting period is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. Courts may excuse noncompliance with that rule absent an express prohibition on doing so. Remand is therefore not “futile.” The Panel’s sua sponte conclusion to the contrary was error. Rehearing should be granted to correct the Panel’s error and confirm that judges are empowered to address “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances even when they arise exigently. At a minimum, the Panel should grant rehearing and order full briefing on this important issue, which was neither decided below nor fully briefed on appeal.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Thomas Bryant, Jr., Supporting Reversal.

Argument: Sentencing courts have broad discretion to modify a sentence under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Sentencing courts have authority to grant motions for compassionate release if the defendant does not meet one of the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" described by the Commission. Vesting sentencing courts with discretion to identify "extraordinary and compelling reasons" is consistent with the judge's role at an initial sentencing and does not open any "floodgates." The District Court's order should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Certiorari is warranted because the Third Circuit’s decision prohibits a whole class of crack-cocaine offenders from being eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act while identically situated defendants in other circuits may be resentenced.  The Third Circuit’s rule is inconsistent with Congress’s goal of providing relief to low-level drug offenders because it excludes the lowest-level offenders and those with uncertain drug amounts from resentencing while allowing those who possessed greater amounts of crack cocaine to obtain relief.  Defendants convicted for possessing lower-quantities of crack cocaine could receive substantial sentence reductions even though they remain eligible for the same sentence.  The Third Circuit’s rule frustrates Congress’s goal of providing relief to the disproportionate number of Black Americans incarcerated for crack-cocaine offenses.

Brief of Amici Curiae the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Due Process Institute, R Street Institute, and Americans for Prosperity Foundation in Support of Defendant/Cross-Appellee.

Argument: The text of §403(b) applies the sentencing amendments to §924(c) at resentencing. The text of §403(b), not the savings statute, governs application of the sentencing amendments. Background principles confirm that §403 applies at resentencing. The government’s rule serves no purpose. The government’s contrary arguments fail. Congress enacted the First Step Act to reform §924(c). In accordance with the text, context, and purpose of the First Step Act, this Court should hold that the sentencing amendments in §403 apply to sentences imposed after the First Step Act’s effective date, including at a de novo resentencing.