Memorandum and Order granting compassionate release. 

Argument: Daniel Brown pleaded guilty to four counts, including two 924(c) counts for a total sentence of 510 months. The sentencing judge indicated at the time that the stacked 924(c)s yielded a sentence “far greater than necessary to achieve the ends of justice.” A codefendant was sentenced to only 170 months and released prior to the compassionate release motion. A prior compassionate release motion citing rehabilitation and the draconian sentence had been denied “at th[at] juncture.” The court granted this second motion, citing Brown’s frequent letters to the court, his unsuccessful pursuit of executive clemency, the increased amount of time Brown had served, the COVID-19 pandemic, then in its early stages, and Brown’s risk factors for COVID-19. No cases had been confirmed in Brown’s facility at the time of the court’s grant of compassionate release.

On the First Step Act’s changes to allow defendants to move for compassionate release on their own behalf:

“The Act listed these changes under the title of “Increasing the Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release.” § 603(b), 132 Stat. at 5239. That title is “especially valuable” here. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1090. The Court assumes the BOP Director faithfully executes the narrowly drawn policy and program statements related to compassionate release. Therefore, the only way direct motions to district courts would increase the use of compassionate release is to allow district judges to consider the vast variety of reasons that may be ‘extraordinary and compelling.’”

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in South Dakota

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in North Dakota

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in Nebraska

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in Missouri

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in Minnesota

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in Iowa

Attorney-client communications federal caselaw and state-specific anecdotal data in Arkansas

Order granting compassionate release: pre-COVID grant where defendant’s sentence of 848 months “is forty years longer than the sentence he likely would have received (368 months) if he were sentenced under the law (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C)) as it now exists.

United States Court of Appeals for The Eighth Circuit: Wilkins v. Bowersox; on appeal from the US District Court for the District of Missouri.

Brief Amici Curiae Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, National Association of Public Defense, National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The District Court's order denying necessary funds constitutes denial of Mr. Christeson's 18 U.S.C. § 3599 right to capital habeas counsel. Summary denial of adequate funds for federal capital habeas representation deprives death-sentenced defendants due process and equal protection of law. Requiring capital post-conviction counsel to proceed without sufficient support for time-intensive legal work, mitigation investigation, and forensic experts perpetuates deficient, unethical representation. Summarily stopping capital counsel from doing their jobs as ordered by the United States Supreme Court amounts to a callous abuse of discretion that threatens the integrity of the entire justice system.

Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Randell G. Shelton, Jr., Reversal, and Remand.

Argument: This case involves an important question of criminal law: Under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, what is the appropriate remedy when a government agent acts in shocking bad faith, intentionally “wiping” his government-issued, undercover laptop computer instead of delivering it for a forensic evaluation as instructed? The Court below found that the agent acted in bad faith and violated Appellant’s due process rights, but nevertheless fashioned a remedy short of dismissal. The remedy given by the Court wasn’t nearly sufficient to (a) satisfy the defendant’s right to seek and discover potentially exculpatory evidence; (b) punish the government for wrongful conduct in this case, or (c) deter wrongful conduct in future cases by similarly situated government agents or entities. This issue strikes at the heart of the due process guarantee and the fairness of the justice system. Dismissal is the only remedy that will appropriately redress the government’s acts of bad faith and violations of Appellant’s due process rights.

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Eight Law Professors in support of appellant.

Argument: Per Morrison v. Olson(1988), a judge should not preside over a trial in which she was intimately involved with the prosecution in the events leading up to trial and should have disqualified herself from hearing defendant-appellant’s new trial motion when her pretrial participation in the prosecution belatedly came to light after defendant’s trial.

Brief of Juvenile Law Center, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al. as amici curiae on Behalf of Appellant (full list of amici in appendix to attached brief).

Argument: Miller reaffirms the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition that children are categorically less deserving of the harshest forms of punishments. Miller v. Alabama applies retroactively. Miller is retroactive because Kuntrell Jackson received the same relief on collateral review. Miller applies retroactively pursuant to Teague v. Lane. Miller is retroactive because it announces a substantive rule that categorically prohibits the imposition of mandatory life without parole on all juvenile offenders. Miller is retroactive because it involves a substantive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that reflects the Supreme Court’s evolving understanding of child and adolescent development. Miller is a "watershed rule" under Teague. Once the Court declares a particular sentence "cruel and unusual" when imposed on a juvenile, the continued imposition of that sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.