Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf off the National Association of Criminal Defense  Lawyers in Support of Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing en Banc

Argument: On appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, NACDL’s Amicus Brief is in Support of a Petition for Rehearing En Banc. Issue: The issue raised is the court’s refusal to instruct on a statute of limitations defense, which seriously impaired Ravenell’s ability to present his defense, resulted in the denial of the constitutional right to have a jury decide if the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution does not violate the statute of limitations. The panel found the district court need not instruct the jury on a statute of limitations defense timely raised by the defendant. NACDL argues that the panel majority failed to protect the rights of the accused and undermined the fundamental protections of our criminal justice system when it concluded that a district court need not instruct a jury on a statute-of-limitations defense and also improperly substituted its own evaluation of the trial evidence for that of the jury. If the panel majority’s decision, which conflicts with Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent, is not corrected it will adversely affect criminal defendants in the future and undermine the fair administration of justice in criminal cases within the Circuit: the denial of the constitutional right to have a jury decide if the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecution does not violate the statute of limitations.

Reply brief of the appellant in US v. Chatrie. Michael Price, the Fourth Amendment Center's Litigation Director, is co-counsel for Mr. Chatrie. 

Memorandum Opinion Granting Motion for Compassioante Release 

Argument: Court based ECR on COVID and medical issues (58, kidney cancer, Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, chronic kidney disease, asthma, arthritis, and gout), HOWEVER, for 3553(a) factors, court focused on fact that Wise would not be a career offender today. 

The fact remains that if Wise had been sentenced in August 2019, as opposed to July 2019, he likely would have received a lower sentence than the one he received, because he would not have been labeled as a Career Offender. Viewed from that perspective, Wise's incarceration — for a period of about twelve months — is sufficient to serve the goals of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.

Opinion and Order Granting Motion to Sentence Reduction 

Argument: Leon Ford Jr. was sentenced to 483 months for four counts, including two 924(c) counts. Motion based on diabetes and other health issues, as well as amendments to 924(c). Ford was also sentenced before the decisions in Booker and Dean that affected sentencing. Sentence reduced to time served (equivalent of 24 years with good time). Court noted and was “mindful” of sentencing disparity despite government concession that health issues and COVID alone constituted extraordinary and compelling reason. “[W]hile the sentencing disparities that result from the First Step Act’s amendment to 924(c) do not necessarily constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction, the Court is mindful of this factor in this case.”

Order

Argument: Stewart was convicted after trial of bank robbery and two counts of § 924(c) and sentenced to nearly 42 years. He had served 13 years (and, including a MDNC case, a total of 28 years) at time 3582(c)(1)(A) motion filed.

Court found following intervening changes in law to be ECR: guidelines are no longer mandatory (Booker); second 924(c) charge would carry only 5-year consecutive sentence, not 20 years; Stewart would not be a career offender today because predicate NC offense does not qualify under Simmons. Court notes it is not "correcting" a sentence; rather it is considering "changes in sentencing law—even nonretroactive ones—in assessing whether a defendant has shown extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction in his sentence." Court also notes Stewart's age (56) and Stewart's hypertension, and the rampant COVID outbreak at Ft. Dix.

Supplement to Pro Se CR Motion (Apr. 22, 2021)

Response (May 24, 2021)

Reply (June 1, 2021)

Def's Notice of Supp Authority (June 2, 2021)

Order (June 8, 2021)

Argument: Sloan was originally sentenced to Life plus 540 months after trial on several crack conspiracy and gun counts, Sentence was later reduced to 235 months on drug counts and remained at 540 months on 3 stacked 924(c)s. Sloan has now served 30 years and has 34 years remaining.  Defense argues ECR exists because of following intervening changes in law:

1)  DOJ's Robinson Memo "adopting practice of basing each Section 924(c) in an indictment upon a separate predicate offense";

2) pre-Booker, so guidelines were mandatory at time of sentencing

3) SCOTUS prohibited mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders as client was between 15-20 during conspiracy and is 48 years old now. 

4) SCOTUS decided Dean v. US, stating district courts can and should consider the mandatory consecutive nature of 924(c) sentences 

5) Prior to FSA changing the 924(c) stacking provisions, which would not result in a 180-month sentence, rather thana 540-month sentence

The Court found ECR existed because Sloan’s original 540-month sentence based on stacked § 924(c)s would result in a 180-month sentence today.  Other supporting factors include strong evidence of rehabilitation (47 programs and work assessments, earned GED, two minor infractions in 30 years of prison); he was juvenile when he committed the crimes and 22 when sentenced; and his strong support network and community. Court reduces sentence to time-served plus 14 days. 

Memorandum 

Argument: Craig Scott was serving a sentence of over 87 months on three counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy, plus a consecutive 45 years for three 924(c) counts. The court commuted his sentence to time served (“almost 25 years”) on the basis that the change in law regarding stacked 924(c)s was an extraordinary and compelling reason.

“Multiple district courts have reasoned that “the First Step Act’s change in how sentences should be calculated when multiple § 924(c) charges are included in the same indictment constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).” See United States v. Owens, No. 97-CR-2546-CAB, ECF 93 at 4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2020) (collecting cases). The court agrees with the reasoning of these courts.”

Memorandum Opinion 

Argument: Order reducing a 2002 mandatory life sentence for an 851 career offender/mandatory life client who was convicted at trial of conspiracy pwid/FIP. Judge Messitte “found that the disparity between the life sentence Mr. Sappleton received and the sentence he would receive under the law today established an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce his sentence under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A).  Second, he held that Mr. Sappleton was eligible for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act and that the Court “can, and indeed should apply the current section 851 (i.e., as amended by section 401 of the First Step Act) in imposing a new sentence.” Judge Messitte explained that “[a]pplying defunct statutory penalties would [] be inconsistent with the text of section 404(b), which expressly permits the court to  ‘impose a reduced sentence.’” 

Order granting motion to reduce sentence 

Argument: Order reducing a 2002 mandatory life sentence for an 851 career offender/mandatory life client who was convicted at trial of conspiracy pwid/FIP. Judge Messitte “found that the disparity between the life sentence Mr. Sappleton received and the sentence he would receive under the law today established an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce his sentence under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A).  Second, he held that Mr. Sappleton was eligible for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act and that the Court “can, and indeed should apply the current section 851 (i.e., as amended by section 401 of the First Step Act) in imposing a new sentence.” Judge Messitte explained that “[a]pplying defunct statutory penalties would [] be inconsistent with the text of section 404(b), which expressly permits the court to  ‘impose a reduced sentence.’” 

Motion (June 23, 2021)

Goverment Response (Aug. 12, 2021)

Reply (Aug. 27, 2021)

Notice of Supplemental Authority (Oct. 14, 2021)

Order Granting Release (Oct. 29, 2021)

Argument: At the age of 25, Mr. Richardson and others committed several bank robberies.  Mr. Richardson was convicted of two bank robbery offenses and two § 924(c) offenses resulting in a combined sentence of 405 months, or almost 34 years prison. Due to the First Step Acts changes in the § 924(c) stacking provision, were he sentenced today, Mr. Richardson would likely receive only a 189-month sentence.  In its Order, the Court noted that Mr. Richardson had served more than 210 months in prison, where he had successfully completed numerous education programs and work assignments. The court also relied on Mr. Richardson’s lack of a serious criminal history, relative youth at the time of his offenses, his release plan to a stable home, and the 18-year disparity between the § 924(c) sentence he originally received and the sentence he would receive today.  The court then reduced Mr. Richardson’s sentence from 405 months to time-served plus 14 days.  Instead of a release date of 2035, Mr. Richardson will soon be home with his family.  

Memorandum Opinion granting sentence reduction 

Argument: Derrick Redd was sentenced to 603 months based on three stacked 924(c)s and robbery offenses. Court held that: (1) Mr. Redd had exhausted his administrative remedies; (2) extraordinary and compelling reasons existed to warrant reduction in his sentence; (3) reduction in Mr. Redd’s sentence was consistent with applicable policy statements; and (4) reduction of his sentence from 45 years to 15 years was appropriate.

Addendum to Motion (Aug. 6, 2020)

Motion for Reconsideration (Nov. 6, 2020) 

Order (Dec. 17, 2020)

Argument: Motion for reconsideration; court had previously denied motion in October based on lack of medical condition; no grating MRF due to sentencing disparity based on 924(c) stacking. Discussion is relatively light – Owen was originally a co-defendant of McCoy (whose case was heard by the 4th Cir.)

Memorandum Order 

Argument:  Originally sentenced to life imprisonment dictated by an 851 enhancement.  Even during his 2004 sentencing, the sentencing judge had said he would have imposed a lesser sentence if he had the authority to do so.  The court found ECR to reduce Mr. Nicholson’s sentence based on the disparity between the sentence he received and the one he would receive today following Section 401 of the FSA.  Alternatively, the court held that it had the authority to reduce Mr. Nicholson’s sentence under Section 404 (crack retroactivity) of the First Step Act by applying current 851 law.

Memorandum Opinion. 

Argument: Paul Kratsas had a mandatory life sentence imposed in 1993. His case differs from those with stacked § 924(c) sentences because, today, a life sentence could still be imposed. Importantly, the sentencing judge “lamented his duty to impose the mandatory life sentence and stated that, if sentencing pursuant to the then mandatory Guidelines, which were 360 months to life, he would impose a sentence of 360 months and not life.” One of the “original prosecutors, now in private practice, support[ed] the request for immediate release.” Judge Chasanow found that those factors as well as Kratsas’ “current dangerousness and the § 3553(a) factors support[ed] granting release.”