Brief for Professors Stephen Smith, Hadar Aviram, John Burkoff, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: When Congress uses a term that has acquired a well-established common-law meaning, it is presumed to adopt that meaning. The well-established common-law definition of "simple assault" uniformly required an attempt or threat to inflict injury on another. Nothing in § 111 overcomes the presumption that the term "simple assault" carries its common-law meaning. A circuit split has developed regarding whether the common-law definition of "simple assault" applies to § 111.

Comments to the Department of Justice National Security Division responding to the department’s request for suggestions on clarifying and modernizing the implementing regulations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (FARA).

Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners (in support of petition for writ of certiorari).

Argument: The Second Circuit’s interpretations of “property” and “thing of value” violate this Court’s precedents. Deeming regulatory information “confidential” does not give the government a property interest in that information. Confidential information about regulatory plans is not “a thing of value” under Section 641. The Second Circuit’s interpretations of “property” and “thing of value” criminalize core First Amendment activity.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents.

Argument: First, there must be a specific reason not to apply the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to servicemembers. As there is no issue of military importance that excludes servicemembers from the protections of the Eighth Amendment, rape of an adult cannot be an “offense punishable by death.” Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the crime of rape of an adult cannot be punishable by death. Petitioner has not met its burden to provide a military-specific exception for the application of the Eighth Amendment to servicemembers. Here, the Petitioner offers policy prescriptions and “national security” reasons which are insufficient to deprive a service-member of his or her constitutional rights. Further, canons of statutory interpretation require that Article 43 must be read to protect applicable constitutional rights. Specifically, sections in the same statutory scheme should be read in pari materia, or interpreted together. Article 43, at the time of Respondents’ alleged offenses, had no statute of limitations for crimes punishable by death, including rape, but established a five-year limitation otherwise; however, Article 55 prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, mirroring the Eighth Amendment. Applying Supreme Court precedent that precludes death as a punishment for rape of an adult, Article 43 read in conjunction with Article 55 requires that rape was subject to a five-year statute of limitations at the time of the alleged offenses. Lastly, civilian law must inform the interpretation of the UCMJ. The CAAF may not freely disregard Supreme Court precedent without a “legitimate military necessity or distinction.” Therefore, the CAAF’s decision to reverse Respondents’ convictions should be affirmed.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellee.

Argument:  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) applies to “an officer, director, employee, or agent” of a domestic concern or issuer.  The Government argues that “agent” means a common-law agent, but that reading of the statute is entirely at odds with both the FCPA’s plain text and the Act’s legislative history.  Congress intended for “agent” to mean a specific type of individual:  a foreign intermediary used to pay bribes.  If “agent” meant “common-law agent,” as the Government says, there would have been no need for Congress to specify “officer” or “employee”—both are “common-law agents.”  The legislative history also demonstrates that Congress had bribe-paying foreign “consultants” or “intermediaries” in mind when it crafted the FCPA to cover “agents.”  Reading the word “agent” broadly would raise serious concerns about extraterritorial application that Congress specifically sought to avoid.  Such a reading would also run afoul of well-established principles of lenity.

 Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Defendants-Appellants.

Argument: The presumption of mens rea is deeply rooted and has historically applied beyond merely distinguishing culpable from innocent conduct.  The mens rea requirement arose to ensure punishment was fair and proportional.  The mens rea requirement applies to offenders guilty of otherwise culpable conduct.  The presumption of mens rea contains only a narrow exception for public-welfare offenses.  The presumption of mens rea should apply to drug quantity and type under 21 U.S.C. § 841.

Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Designating information as confidential is not enough to make it “property” in the government’s hands. This Court should not expand Section 641 and provide the government with an all-purpose tool for prosecuting leaks.

Brief for Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal

Argument: Confidential government information is not “property” for purposes of wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud. Wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud protect a victim’s property, not regulatory, rights. CMS does not have a property interest in information regarding a regulatory decision. Confidential government information is not a “thing of value” or “property” for purposes of Section 641. Congress has developed a measured, deliberate, and tailored regime for controlling government information. Expanding Section 641 to criminalize virtually any unauthorized disclosure of confidential information would vitiate Congress’s measured, deliberate, and tailored regime for controlling government information. The prosecution’s interpretation of “property” and “thing of value” criminalize core First Amendment activity.

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers In Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Argument: Over 200 years ago, this Court declared that there are no federal common law crimes. Although that rule remains in place, the intervening years have witnessed the creation of quasi-common law crimes. These are crimes that rest on statutory terms so broad and indefinite that courts are left to define the elements of the offense with little or no guidance from the statutory text. Quasi-common law crimes shift the task of defining what conduct deserves "the moral condemnation of the community" from the legislature, where it belongs, to the courts. This Court has sought to remedy the lack of fair warning inherent in quasi-common law crimes through a process of interpretation that often resembles common law crime definition. Insider trading liability--and, in particular, the liability of tippers and tippees at issue here—has followed the same pattern. In the tipper/tippee insider trading context, therefore--as in the antitrust and honest services contexts--the Court, rather than Congress, has determined the elements of the crime. And as in those contexts, a person seeking to conform his conduct to the law when trading on a tip of nonpublic information will learn virtually nothing from the statutory text. He must turn instead to Dirks' "simple and clear 'guiding principle' for determining tippee liability" and act accordingly. The Court's definition of these and other quasi-common law crimes--its creation of "simple and clear guiding principle[s]" for determining whether an offense has been committed--ameliorates (but does not eliminate) the fair warning danger such crimes present. But the Court's decisions perform that function only if the lower courts treat their operative language as if Congress had included that language in the statute itself. If lower courts can modify the Court's "guiding principles" materially, as the court of appeals did here, and thus broaden the scope of criminal liability, then the lack of fair warning inherent in quasi-common law crimes will remain. It is therefore essential to individual liberty that the Court rigorously police the lower courts' application of its decisions defining quasi-common law crimes. The need for the Court's intervention is particularly acute here, because the court of appeals endorsed an expansion of the tipper/tippee insider trading crime that the Court declined to adopt in Salman.

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Respondents

Argument: The government’s proposed use of constitutional avoidance would be unprecedented. This Court has never used constitutional avoidance to broaden a criminal statute. The government’s proposal would broaden the application of the Section 924(c) Residual Clause. This Court never has used constitutional avoidance to interpret identical language in related statutes to mean different things, as the government has proposed here. The government’s proposed use of constitutional avoidance would reduce the canon to an arbitrary tool with dangerous rule-of-law implications. The government’s proposed use of constitutional avoidance is irreconcilable with the due process right to fair notice. The government’s proposed use of constitutional avoidance fundamentally is at odds with the rule of lenity and the principles of fairness underlying the rule. The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal statutes be construed in the defendant’s favor. Application of the rule of lenity is necessary to uphold the separation of powers and protect principles of fairness.

Brief for Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Reason Foundation and Five Criminal and Health Law Scholars In Support of Defendants-Appellants Urging Reversal.

Argument: This Court held in United States v. Whiteside, 285 F. 3d 1345, 1351 (11th Cir. 2002), that a false statement charge cannot succeed when the statement is true under an objectively reasonable interpretation of the law. Under Whiteside, a statement is knowingly false only when its falsity is clear. Whiteside is an important protection against inappropriate prosecutions. Whiteside prevents government overreaching in uncertain regulatory environments. Whitesidecurbs inappropriate prosecutions based on breach of contract. Whiteside protects against arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement, as occurred here. The Whiteside question should have been resolved by the district court, and this Court should conduct the Whiteside analysis de novo.

Amicus curiae brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and The Cato Institute in support of petitioner and urging reversal.

Argument: This Court has repeatedly applied the rule of lenity and other tools of statutory interpretation to limit prosecutors’ expansive applications of federal criminal statutes. This Court has required a clear statement from Congress before it will interpret a federal criminal statute to shift the federal-state balance in law enforcement. This case implicates the concerns that have caused this Court to interpret criminal statutes narrowly.

Amici Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Ninth Circuit Federal Public and Community Defenders in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Congress lacks the power to prohibit crime against a building because its occupants engage in activities that affect interstate commerce. The Jones Court deliberately construed § 844(i) to avoid the pitfall identified by Morrison and Lopez. The panel erred by asking the question eschewed by Jones, thereby extending § 844(i) ‘s reach unconstitutionally.

Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Petitioner and Urging Reversal.

Argument: The Court should reverse the court of appeals' decision and reinforce the principle that, no matter how culpable the defendant's behavior, a conviction may only be obtained under a statute that clearly encompasses the conduct at issue. In addition to the rules of statutory interpretation urged in petitioner's brief, the Court should interpret § 1344(1) in light of the principle that "unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance." To the extent ambiguity remains after the Court has interpreted the statute, "the tie must go to the defendant" under the rule of lenity.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner (on Petition for Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: A defendant does not "obtain" property by depriving the victim of his "right to control" property. The decision below exemplifies a broader pattern of overcriminalization through expansive interpretation of federal criminal laws. The Second Circuit's reading of the federal criminal fraud statutes conflicts with the rule of lenity and clear statement principles.