NACDL supports the Commission’s proposed amendment to §1B1.13, with some suggested modifications, and supports Option 3 to (b)(6). After reviewing the Commission’s recent hearings on this proposed amendment as well as the submitted written testimony, NACDL focuses its comments on proposals (b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(4).

We submit these comments on the interim rule, published by BOP on December 5, 2013 … on sentence reduction for extraordinary and compelling reasons. The first provision codifies existing practice by which, when considering a prisoner for reduction in sentence, the General Counsel solicits the opinion of the United States Attorney in the district in which the prisoner was sentenced. The second provision provides that the Bureau’s “final decision is subject to the general supervision and direction of the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General.” Neither provision should be adopted.

Comments with FAMM to Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco regarding U.S. Attorney offices requiring waiver of the right to seek compassionate release during plea negotiations.

Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and FAMM in Support of Defendant/Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing and/or Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Appellee Raia’s Petition for Rehearing addresses the discretion of a district court to excuse the 30-day waiting period for compassionate release under the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A). On April 2, 2020, the Panel declined to remand this case under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 12.1, stating that remand would be “futile.” In so ruling, the Panel necessarily concluded that the 30-day waiting period cannot be excused or waived. That conclusion was inconsistent with both Supreme Court and Circuit precedent. The ruling creates inconsistency in the Circuit’s treatment of all claims-processing rules, and undermines courts’ equitable authority in a wide range of cases. The30-day waiting period is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. Courts may excuse noncompliance with that rule absent an express prohibition on doing so. Remand is therefore not “futile.” The Panel’s sua sponte conclusion to the contrary was error. Rehearing should be granted to correct the Panel’s error and confirm that judges are empowered to address “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances even when they arise exigently. At a minimum, the Panel should grant rehearing and order full briefing on this important issue, which was neither decided below nor fully briefed on appeal.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant Thomas Bryant, Jr., Supporting Reversal.

Argument: Sentencing courts have broad discretion to modify a sentence under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Sentencing courts have authority to grant motions for compassionate release if the defendant does not meet one of the "extraordinary and compelling reasons" described by the Commission. Vesting sentencing courts with discretion to identify "extraordinary and compelling reasons" is consistent with the judge's role at an initial sentencing and does not open any "floodgates." The District Court's order should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Brief of Amici Curiae Public Defender Service and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Appellant.

Argument: First, the D.C. COVID-19 Emergency Act authorized compassionate release for "extraordinary and compelling" reasons not specifically enumerated in the statute, including a prisoner's heightened vulnerability to COVID-19. Second, courts must consider all relevant evidence in assessing the defendant's vulnerability to COVID-19, regardless of whether the defendant's particular medical conditions have been identified by the CDC as clear risk factors for severe illness from COVID-19. Third, good time credit counts toward the percentage of the sentence served under the statute. Fourth, rulings on compassionate release motions are subject to ordinary appellate review for abuse of discretion.

Brief for Amici Curiae Center on the Administration of Criminal Law, FAMM, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, in Support of Appellant and Reversal

Argument: The governing statute, properly construed, does not authorize BOP to refuse to file a sentencing reduction motion for reasons that Congress expressly assigned to a Court for consideration. BOP has routinely refused to recommend the filing of sentence reduction motions for plainly qualified candidates, with results that are not only unlawful but also tragic. District courts have jurisdiction and authority to require BOP to comply with the statutory scheme and file sentence reduction motions for qualified candidates, so that sentencing judges can decide whether, when and to what extent a sentence should be reduced for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.”