Cruel and unusual punishment involves the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or terror or disgrace “to the dignity of man” and may be invoked as a defense in a criminal case.

from Capital Sentencing and the Graham-Miller Resentencing to Sentencing in all Cases

Keynote speakers from the 2020 Presidential Summit and Sentencing Symposium, co-hosted with the Georgetown University Law Center American Criminal Law Review

Panel from the 2020 Presidential Summit and Sentencing Symposium, co-hosted with the Georgetown University Law Center American Criminal Law Review

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Arkansas Civil Liberties Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: Courts of appeals that have rejected petitioner's view of Section 2255(e) have held that relief under Section 2241 is available only if an incarcerated individual shows that Section 2255's remedy "was" inadequate or ineffective at the time of the individual's "first § 2255 motion." Pet. App. 7a (emphasis [*8] added); see also McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1081 (11th Cir. 2017) ("The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the remedy by motion was 'inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'") (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 594 (10th Cir. 2011) (similar). In other words, these courts have focused on the adequacy or efficacy of the remedy under Section 2255 in the past. This reasoning departs from the plain text of that statute. The relevant text of Section 2255(e) focuses on the present. It allows federal prisoners to seek habeas relief under Section 2241 when the remedy provided by Section 2255 " is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added). Put another way, this saving clause asks whether Section 2255's remedy is currently inadequate or ineffective, not whether it was inadequate or ineffective.

Does a common feature of restitution orders – joint and several liability – violate the Excessive Fines Clause? There is “no general federal right to contribution” between co-defendants under restitution orders. This seemingly creates an Eighth Amendment problem in that a defendant can be held jointly liable for a co-defendant’s restitution yet has no right to collect contribution from the co-defendant.

A Substantial Threat to Civil Rights Claims and a Potentially Fatal Blow to Eighth Amendment Claims

The author discusses “ultra-particularity” – a clever tool used to invoke qualified immunity and shield officers and jailers from liability. The article explores Supreme Court and circuit court opinions, and what it takes to prevail on a claim outside of the more commonplace excessive force claims.

Incarcerated individuals are entitled to a basic standard of care, but stories of subhuman conditions still abound in the media. Defense attorneys perhaps can obtain additional doctor visits or proper medication. The fundamental abuses, however, are harder to combat.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner (On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari).

Argument: In Honeycutt v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the government may not impose a forfeiture order against a criminal defendant on the basis of joint and several liability, overturning decades of precedent to the contrary. Before Honeycutt, many forfeiture orders were imposed on defendants based on their joint and several liability. When habeas relief is unavailable, these defendants should be able to obtain relief through an extraordinary writ, such as the writ of coram nobis or audita querela, for three reasons. First, these forfeiture orders were issued without lawful authority and therefore violate due process. Second, these forfeiture orders exceed what Congress has deemed permissible and therefore violate the Eighth Amendment. And third, allowing these forfeiture orders to stand in light of these due process and Eighth Amendment violations is not in the public interest.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents.

Argument: First, there must be a specific reason not to apply the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to servicemembers. As there is no issue of military importance that excludes servicemembers from the protections of the Eighth Amendment, rape of an adult cannot be an “offense punishable by death.” Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the crime of rape of an adult cannot be punishable by death. Petitioner has not met its burden to provide a military-specific exception for the application of the Eighth Amendment to servicemembers. Here, the Petitioner offers policy prescriptions and “national security” reasons which are insufficient to deprive a service-member of his or her constitutional rights. Further, canons of statutory interpretation require that Article 43 must be read to protect applicable constitutional rights. Specifically, sections in the same statutory scheme should be read in pari materia, or interpreted together. Article 43, at the time of Respondents’ alleged offenses, had no statute of limitations for crimes punishable by death, including rape, but established a five-year limitation otherwise; however, Article 55 prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, mirroring the Eighth Amendment. Applying Supreme Court precedent that precludes death as a punishment for rape of an adult, Article 43 read in conjunction with Article 55 requires that rape was subject to a five-year statute of limitations at the time of the alleged offenses. Lastly, civilian law must inform the interpretation of the UCMJ. The CAAF may not freely disregard Supreme Court precedent without a “legitimate military necessity or distinction.” Therefore, the CAAF’s decision to reverse Respondents’ convictions should be affirmed.

Report of the Sex Offender Policy Task Force reflecting NACDL's policy on sex offender registries and other practices as adopted by the Board of Directors.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Mississippi Office of the State Public Defender, and Mississippi Public Defenders Association In Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The Supreme Court has held that life without parole is appropriate only for a “permanently incorrigible” juvenile offender.  States like Mississippi that do not require a finding of permanent incorrigibility are not reliably implementing that command because offenders receive life-without-parole sentences even if they are capable of change.  Mississippi’s approach also produces arbitrary sentencing outcomes, because a juvenile’s sentence depends on whether his sentencer independently comprehends Miller, not on whether he is actually permanently incorrigible.  States that require a finding of permanent incorrigibility ensure that juvenile offenders only receive life-without-parole sentences when the sentence is proportionate and lawful.  Sentencers can still impose life-without-parole sentences when an offender is actually permanently incorrigible. 

Brief of the National Association Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant.

Argument: Tennessee’s sentencing statute for first-degree murder, which mandatorily imposes a minimum 51-year term of prison confinement on a juvenile, without consideration of the teenager’s youth and immaturity or other mitigating circumstances, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clauses and other provisions of the federal and state constitutions. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 460 (2016), the United States Supreme Court held that, in light of contemporary understanding of adolescent psychology and brain development, it is unconstitutional to mandatorily deprive a juvenile offender of “a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Because a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for 51 years exceeds the expected life-span of offenders sentenced at a young age, it does not provide young offenders with the “meaningful opportunity” for release contemplated by the Supreme Court of the United States. A majority of state court decisions from outside Tennessee have held that term-of-years sentences of over fifty years do not provide young offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release. Further, after Miller and Montgomery, numerous state legislatures have enacted juvenile sentencing and parole procedures allowing juveniles the opportunity for parole within a much shorter time period.

Memorandum of Amici Curiae the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Vermont.

Argument: The COVID-19 pandemic is of unprecedented national and global significance, necessitating a drastic local response. The rate of infection in the Vermont DOC is striking in comparison both to the rate of infection in Vermont as a whole, and even compared to the highest rate of infection for any state in the country. The Department of Corrections is demonstrably ill-equipped to adequately respond to the pandemic, and the Court must intervene to protect the constitutional rights of those incarcerated. The Court should join with judges from other jurisdictions across the country, who have reviewed inmate motions and petitions similar to those that are currently before this Court, and who have taken steps to reduce incarceration by releasing inmates on bail in light of this unprecedented pandemic and the conditions of confinement issues it brings to light.

Brief of Amicus Curiae, Office of the Ohio Public Defender [and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers] in Support of Appellant, David C. Kinney, Jr.

Argument: The prohibition in R.C. 2953.08(D)(3)--which is entirely unique to Ohio--is most accurately understood as a legislative oversight with severe unintended consequences. But even if not, it is unconstitutional on both cruel-and-unusual-punishment and equal-protection grounds. Amici Curiae urge this Court to provide meaningful appellate review of sentences for aggravated murder in Ohio.

Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner.

Argument: The due process clause and 18 U.S. C. § 924(d) require that a firearm be subject to forfeiture to extinguish ownership. The statutory history of § 922(g) does not suggest any intent to allow deprivation of ownership interest without any process. Section 924(d) explicitly distinguishes between an "owner," a "possessor" and a "delegate." Ability to transfer possession to a third party is consistent with the fact that a disability may be temporary. Like forfeiture, permanent retention of firearms may be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment.