Paul Kratsas had a mandatory life sentence imposed in 1993. His case differs from those with stacked § 924(c) sentences because, today, a life sentence could still be imposed. Importantly, the sentencing judge “lamented his duty to impose the mandatory life sentence and stated that, if sentencing pursuant to the then mandatory Guidelines, which were 360 months to life, he would impose a sentence of 360 months and not life.” One of the “original prosecutors, now in private practice, support[ed] the request for immediate release.” Judge Chasanow found that those factors as well as Kratsas’ “current dangerousness and the § 3553(a) factors support[ed] granting release.”

Judge Moore held that: (1) the Sentencing Commission's policy statement on reduction of term of imprisonment did not apply to cases where imprisoned person filed motion for compassionate release, and (2) the District Court satisfied its obligation to explain its consideration of statutory sentencing factors.

Haynes had served almost 27 years of a 46.5-year sentence for various offenses, including conspiracy to commit bank robbery, four counts of robbery. “A full 40 of those years are the mandatory consecutive terms for the two additional 18 U.S.C § 924(c) counts (“stacked” under then-current law) that the government charged in a superseding indictment only when Haynes declined a plea offer and exercised his right to trial.”

The Court reduced Hayes’ sentence to time-served, citing as ECR, “the brutal impact of Haynes's original sentence, its drastic severity as compared to codefendant Rivers's ten-year term, its harshness as compared to the sentences imposed on similar and even more severe criminal conduct today, and the extent to which that brutal sentence was a penalty for Haynes's exercise of his constitutional right to trial” and “ the FSA’ elimination of the § 924(c) sentencing weaponry that prosecutors employed to require that sentence. . . ”

Judge Harris held that: (1) the application note to Sentencing Guideline, making the BOP the sole arbiter of whether most reasons qualify as extraordinary and compelling, could not operate to constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons were extraordinary and compelling, with respect to motions brought by defendants; (2) the severity of defendants' sentences, coupled with the disparity between those sentences and sentences they would receive today, constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons for relief under the First Step Act; (3) the fact that Congress chose not to make the First Step Act's elimination of sentence stacking categorically retroactive did not mean that courts could not consider that legislative change in conducting their individualized reviews of motions for compassionate release; and (4) the District Courts' decisions to grant compassionate release to federal prisoners under the First Step Act did not violate the constitutional separation of powers.

Tequila Gunn, who was serving a sentence for drug and firearm offenses, moved for compassionate release on the ground that, because of her age and medical condition, she faced extra risks should she contract COVID-19. After the district court denied her motion, Judge Easterbrook held that the Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify compassionate release is not applicable to compassionate release motions brought by defendants.

Order reducing a 2002 mandatory life sentence for an 851 career offender/mandatory life client who was convicted at trial of conspiracy pwid/FIP. Judge Messitte “found that the disparity between the life sentence Mr. Sappleton received and the sentence he would receive under the law today established an “extraordinary and compelling” reason to reduce his sentence under 18 USC 3582(c)(1)(A).  Second, he held that Mr. Sappleton was eligible for relief under Section 404 of the First Step Act and that the Court “can, and indeed should apply the current section 851 (i.e., as amended by section 401 of the First Step Act) in imposing a new sentence.” Judge Messitte explained that “[a]pplying defunct statutory penalties would [] be inconsistent with the text of section 404(b), which expressly permits the court to  ‘impose a reduced sentence.’” 

Jeremy Zullo, who was serving a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for convictions related to a drug trafficking conspiracy, moved for compassionate release. Judge Calabresi held that: (1) the Sentencing Commission's policy statement regarding what constitutes extraordinary and compelling reasons to justify compassionate release is not “applicable” to compassionate release motions brought by defendants, and thus, application note to Sentencing Guideline, making the BOP the sole arbiter of whether most reasons qualify as extraordinary and compelling, cannot constrain district courts’ discretion to consider whether any reasons are extraordinary and compelling, with respect to motions brought by defendants, and (2) remand was warranted to allow the district court to exercise its discretion in determining whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances justified Zullo’s release.

Angela Beck, who was serving a sentence for drug and firearms offenses, filed a motion under the First Step Act of 2018 seeking the reduction of her sentence and immediate compassionate release due to invasive cancer and the Bureau of Prison's history of indifference to her treatment. Judge Eagles held that: (1) BOP’s gross mismanagement of medical care for Ms. Beck’s invasive breast cancer qualified as an extraordinary and compelling reason to support the reduction of her sentence and a compassionate release, and (2) reduction of Ms. Beck’s sentence to time served, approximately 76 months, for drug and firearms offenses was sufficient to serve the purposes of punishment.

In Feb. 2000, a jury convicted R.V. Young of five counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), and five counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). All told, Young was sentenced to 1,107 months (92.25 years) imprisonment. Judge Trauger held that: (1) the “drastic change” effected by the First Step Act's amendment of the statute that authorized a longer sentence for a second conviction than a first for using a firearm during a crime of violence itself constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce Young’s sentence; (2) Young’s age, health conditions, and 19 years in prison constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons to reduce his sentence; and (3) that a hearing was required for the district court to consider the relevant sentencing factors to determine the appropriate sentence.

Early compassionate release case finding that courts can look beyond USSG 1B1.13 for extraordinary and compelling reasons.

The First Step Act amended the Elderly and Family Reunification for Certain Nonviolent Offenders Pilot Program (“Family Reunification Program”) and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which vests BOP with the discretion to release eligible elderly offenders from Bureau facilities to home confinement. Judge Marmolejo held: (1) the Court had no authority to reject BOP's determination that Mr. Cantu was ineligible under the Family Reunification Program; (2) when a defendant brings a sentence reduction motion under the First Step Act, the court can determine whether any extraordinary and compelling reasons other than those delineated in comments to sentencing guidelines warrant granting relief; (3) the government's non-opposition to elderly prisoner's request constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting sentence reduction under the First Step Act; and (4) Mr. Cantu did not pose a danger to any other person or the community and sentencing factors supported compassionate release.

Court based ECR on COVID and medical issues (58, kidney cancer, Type 2 diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, chronic kidney disease, asthma, arthritis, and gout), HOWEVER, for 3553(a) factors, court focused on fact that Wise would not be a career offender today. 

The fact remains that if Wise had been sentenced in August 2019, as opposed to July 2019, he likely would have received a lower sentence than the one he received, because he would not have been labeled as a Career Offender. Viewed from that perspective, Wise's incarceration — for a period of about twelve months — is sufficient to serve the goals of incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.

r2f brief -  Procedural Reference/cji ff

r2f brief -  Procedural Reference/cji ff

Table of Contents Included in Document 

Memorandum in Support of Habeas Petition in Child Sex Abuse Case

Open Records Request

Letter to Defense Expert

Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

Moiton for New Trial 

Motion for Issuance and Enforcement of Subpoena for Additional Medical Records 

Ruling on Motion for New Trial and Ruling by Georgia Court of Appeals