

No. 25-112

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OKELLO T. CHATRIE, PETITIONER

v.

UNITED STATES

*ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT*

**BRIEF OF EIGHT LAW PROFESSORS AS AMICI
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER**

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INTEREST OF *AMICI CURIAE*

Amici curiae (listed in Appendix A) are law professors with expertise in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and its application to digital surveillance. *Amici's* interest in this case is limited to informing the Court about other reverse warrants that are relevant to the Court's consideration of this case.¹

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

We write not to put forth the many compelling doctrinal reasons why this Court should restrict the use of geofence warrants. We agree with Petitioner and *amici* supporting him who have marshalled these arguments. In brief, geofence queries are without a doubt searches under *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and *Carpenter v. United States*, 585 U.S. 296 (2018), as they invade the private and highly personal data stores of millions of innocent people and dozens to hundreds of people who are just in the wrong place at the wrong time. We also agree that geofence searches like the one in this case raise fatal Fourth Amendment concerns, despite law enforcement seeking a warrant from a magistrate judge.

We write not to focus solely on these arguments but instead to help the Court understand that the outcome and reasoning of this case could unleash a much broader wave of similar reverse searches, and to

¹ Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for *amici* affirm that no party or counsel for a party in the pending case authored this brief. Additionally, no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

identify pools of private information that investigators are likely to want to fish in next. Geofence queries are not unique and to give license to them would result in a dramatic increase in law enforcement power with regard to location and many other sorts of private information.

In today's society, we all create an ever-growing amount of data and information about our daily lives. We create data about our location on a second-to-second basis, detailed catalogues of our thoughts and questions about the world, images of everything in our lives, and detailed portraits of our health and wellbeing. For convenience, we store much of this data, and more, in private storage provided by online service providers. The combination of all of this information creates a ripe target for deep and detailed traditional searches aimed at a particular suspect or suspects of the kind at issue in *Carpenter*, actions that are likely constitutionally permitted when supported by individualized probable cause. 585 U.S. 296 at 316. However, these data troves can also be swept into dragnet *reverse* searches, which sweep in the private information of many people, absent meaningful and individualized suspicion about any particular person who may be caught up.

Supreme Court precedent has long established that the Fourth Amendment requires "some quantum of individualized suspicion" before the government can search through the privacies of life. *Id.* at 317. Whether the government can carry out a particular criminal investigative technique hinges on having such suspicion.

Reverse warrants literally reverse this principle, turning it on its head. Though each type of reverse search presents its own doctrinal concerns, there are common traits among investigative techniques that

are dangerously “reverse” in nature. Those features include that the investigative technique will: (1) likely result in many persons’ information being turned over to law enforcement based on the search; (2) target large quantities of user-generated information; (3) capture information about behavior that is overwhelmingly legal and, in any case, highly sensitive or intimate in nature, even if there may be individuals in the warrant return who have acted unlawfully; and (4) cast suspicion on individuals because of their mere proximity to allegedly illegal activities.

It is worth emphasizing that these four dangers—present to various degrees in every reverse search we highlight—are magnified by the potential for each search to enable and incentivize other reverse searches. A geofence search may place someone at a scene, which enables camera footage to be used to view their likely route away from it, which may reveal an item, which can then be reverse image searched to find others who came into contact with it, etc. In short, reverse investigative tools individually, and when chained together, risk massively increasing government power in a way that is in direct tension with traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. As such, the Court should rule that the geofence warrant in this case violated Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights and craft rules to prevent the expansive use of other reverse searches.

ARGUMENT

I. Reverse Warrants Gratuitously Empower the Government Without Appropriate Fourth Amendment Checks

“The basic purpose” of the Fourth Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals

against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 303 (quoting *Camara v. Mun. Ct.*, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). “Although no single rubric definitively resolves which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection, the analysis is informed by historical understandings of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” *Id.* at 304–05 (footnote, quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (quoting *Carroll v. United States*, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)). And, as the Court has repeatedly recognized, “the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.” *Riley v. California*, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014); *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 303 (quoting *Riley* for this proposition); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, *Digital Rummaging*, 101 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1473 (2024).

In *Carpenter*, the Court found the warrantless search of known individuals’ cell-site location information was too intrusive to survive constitutional challenge. 585 U.S. at 316. Here, the Court is faced with a more invasive electronic surveillance technique. The government in this and similar cases rummages through millions of accounts without particular suspicion as to any specific account. See Brian L. Owsley, *The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Fourth Amendment Implications of Geofence Warrants*, 50 Hofstra L. Rev. 829, 835 (2022). Geofence queries are difficult to distinguish from similar kinds of reverse searches that are poised to provide push-button access to huge pools of private evidence stored with online providers. Your location

data is hardly the only data that could be reverse queried.

No warrant that ranges over the protected data of hundreds of millions of people can be said to comply with the textual requirement of “particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” U.S. Const. amend. IV, or the precedents elaborating that requirement. *E.g.*, *Ybarra v. Illinois*, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); *Groh v. Ramirez*, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (“[T]he purpose of the particularity requirement is not limited to the prevention of general searches. A particular warrant also assures the individual whose property is searched or seized of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); *Berger v. New York*, 388 U.S. 41, 55–58 (1967). As the Court has made clear,

[w]here the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.

Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.

We are guided by this Court’s precedents explaining that although *Katz* focuses on expectations of *privacy*, the central goal of the Amendment is to place limits on the *power* of law enforcement. *Carpenter* outlines two “basic guideposts” for undertaking a historically informed interpretation of the expectation of privacy test:

First, that the Amendment seeks to secure “the privacies of life” against “arbitrary power.” *Boyd v. United States*, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). Second, and relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was “to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.” *United States v. Di Re*, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).

Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 305. What decisions like *Carpenter* make clear is that a key role of the Fourth Amendment is to stand in the way of the government enjoying a passive inheritance of digital omniscience.

This focus on power has led the Court to emphasize the science-fiction-like capabilities of the modern technologies provided by device manufacturers and online service providers. *Carpenter* compares searching through cell-site location information (CSLI) to time travel. 585 U.S. at 312. *Riley* compares the advance of cell phones to rocket travel and wonders what Martians would make of our attachment to them. 573 U.S. at 385. Keeping with the science fiction theme, these devices and the records they produce essentially transform law enforcement officers into crime-fighting robots outfitted with superhuman powers. They can peer into the past, avoiding the “frailties of recollection.” *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 312. They can track every suspect “every moment of every day for five years.” *Id.* They are “tireless,” “ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.” *Id.* at 312, 314.

The point of the Court’s method is not to engage in speculation about an uncertain future. It is to help identify when and where to “place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance,” *id.* at 305 (quoting *Di Re*, 332 U.S. at 595). The Court must attend to the extraordinary power of the police not

only when deciding whether something qualifies as a “search,” but also when ensuring that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

While considering new cases with emerging technologies with “transformative capabilities,” the Court must be careful not to “embarrass the future.” *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 316 (quoting *Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota*, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)). However, the current and future reverse searches we write about are ascertainable; they are things we can talk about and predict with some certainty, across appropriately short time frames.

Crucially, the Court should take note not only of the technology in front of them but should also consider the likely near-future technology we will soon encounter. For example, *Carpenter* noted how “CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision.” *Id.* at 313. In *Kyllo v. United States*, which held that the use of a thermal imaging camera to scan a residence was a search, the Court noted that while the technology used in the case was “relatively crude,” the rule the case created needed to “take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).

At the very least, given the rate of change of technology and business models, the Court should take stock of what has changed between the time a case was litigated until the time it is being considered. In *Carpenter*, the Court assessed how cell-site technology had changed in the seven years that had passed since the district court ruled. *See* 585 U.S. at 313. In *Riley*, the Court noted how the flip phone at issue had already “faded in popularity” in the time it

had taken the case to work through its appeals. 573 U.S. at 385. The Court should do the same here.

II. There Are Many Other Data Sources That May Lead to Invasive Reverse Searches If the Geofence Warrant in this Case Is Found Constitutional.

Geofence queries are not the only reverse searches the police have employed in recent years. There are other, newer forms of reverse location searches that are emerging, including so-called area or Timing Advance warrants for information from cell phone providers. *See, e.g., United States v. Dickerson*, No. 24-CR-83-BHL, 2025 WL 2779095, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 30, 2025) (stating that two Timing Advance location information warrants resulted in law enforcement identifying 44,000 devices in the relevant areas); *United States v. McCracken*, No. 24-CR-3-JFM, 2025 WL 3034953, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2025) (stating that Timing Advance and related warrants revealed information about “thousands of devices”). And law enforcement agencies have obtained warrants to search through Google’s and other companies’ databases of search engine queries, conducting fishing expeditions through the thoughts and reading habits of millions of users.

But these sorts of reverse queries are just the tip of the iceberg. As the Court considers this geofence warrant, it should consider other data sources that will attract police dragnets if reverse techniques are given the green light. Understanding what will follow on the heels of this case will help the Court fashion rules that attend not only to the characteristics of geofence queries but also to its close investigative cousins.

A. The Critical Characteristics of Geofence and Other Reverse Searches Raise Significant Constitutional Concerns

Geofence warrants possess several critical characteristics that raise significant concerns about user privacy, government power, and constitutionality. These characteristics serve as a guide for identifying other private data stores that might attract problematic reverse search requests in the future.

To be clear, each of the examples we review are similar but not identical to geofence warrants. Each will implicate privacy and government power in its own way. We do not mean to suggest that these characteristics offer a rule for assessing Fourth Amendment questions; they are instead a “field guide” for identifying the kinds of investigative novelties the police may turn to next, if they feel empowered by this Court’s opinion.

First, like geofence queries, each of our examples involve the information of many people being turned over to law enforcement.

Second and relatedly, the reverse searches we identify target large databases of user-generated information.

Third, the information accumulated by these searches overwhelmingly concerns legal conduct that is highly intimate or sensitive in nature, and which is often given legal protection in its own right.

Fourth, each of these searches group people into proximate association with other people based not necessarily on human relationships, much less conspiratorial association, but rather on superficial attribute matching. For example, they group together

people in the same place, who use the same kinds of keywords, or who read the same kind of content.

Consider the following examples of reverse searches. Some of these are already being used by the police, albeit in sporadic fashion. Others loom on the horizon, being discussed by the police but possibly held in abeyance while they wait to see what the Court has to say about the geofence prototype.

B. Reverse Keyword Searches

A reverse keyword search warrant enables law enforcement to discover every person who has used a search engine to obtain information about any topic imaginable. Instead of starting with probable cause for a specific target or suspect identified with particularity, a reverse keyword search warrant pores through every search query that every user of that search engine has submitted (possibly confined to a period of time or from an IP address in a specific city or region), obtaining data on a global scale. These warrants target specific words or phrases to attempt to develop a lineup of potential suspects instead of targeting a known suspect. In other words, law enforcement can and does use reverse keyword search warrants to identify potential suspects based on their thoughts and ideas as expressed in internet searches.

When law enforcement applies for a reverse keyword search warrant from search engine providers, the government utilizes a multi-staged process similar to the one used for geofence warrants. *See People v. Seymour*, 536 P.3d 1260, 1268–69 (Colo. 2023). Thus, reverse keyword search warrants raise serious constitutional concerns similar to those raised by geofence warrants, including lack of particularity and overbreadth. Although specific numbers on how

often they are used are unavailable, law enforcement's use of this investigative approach is on the rise.

In a reverse keyword search, the government fashions a list of words or phrases that relate to some criminal activity and submit the terms to a search engine provider. *See, e.g., id.* at 1268 (describing search queries that were provided to Google in a reverse keyword search warrant). To respond to such a request, the search engine provider must search its databases that capture the queries run by their users. *Id.* In a given day, Google alone receives more than 13.5 billion search queries. *See* Vidhya Srinivasan, *AI, Personalization and the Future of Shopping*, Google (Mar. 3, 2025), <https://bit.ly/4kUvaqu> (indicating that, based on internal data, there are “more than 5 trillion searches on Google annually”).

A reverse keyword search warrant targets a phrase or name. For example, if law enforcement sought a term like “Savannah Guthrie” or “Charlie Kirk” to investigate who might have done research on these figures related to recent criminal activity, the searches would capture everyone who has used those terms during the set timeframe and/or from IP addresses within the set geographic scope (often a city or region). This type of search casts a wide net of just about anyone who uses search engines, which violates the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. *See Ybarra*, 444 U.S. at 91. Such a search will invariably capture numbers of innocent individuals who innocuously typed in the phrase, leading to some receiving significantly closer scrutiny by law enforcement and potentially facing charges, even though all they did was search a term or phrase. *See Coolidge v. New Hampshire*, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (decrying “a general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings” by law enforcement).

With reverse keyword searches, the electronic surveillance focuses on the thoughts of individuals. In other words, keyword searches can go to the essence of a person and their identity.

English common law evolved to prevent criminalization of individual thought. 4 William Blackstone, *Commentaries on the Laws of England* 21 (1765). This evolution continued in the United States with the development of the Fourth Amendment. For example, Justice Louis Brandeis posited that the Fourth Amendment served to protect the individual right to be left alone. *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

Additionally, reverse warrants that are intertwined with people's thoughts are not strictly limited to search query databases. They can also be used to search for all users who watched particular videos on platforms like TikTok and YouTube. See Thomas Brewster, *Feds Ordered Google to Unmask Certain YouTube Users. Critics Say It's "Terrifying."* *Forbes* (May 22, 2024), <http://perma.cc/Z8L3-A6Q3>. Such a search will not only affect many innocent adults, but likely minors as well.

As with geofence warrants, reverse keyword searches are overly broad, targeting large quantities of user-generated information that captures far too many individuals' personal data. Geofence warrants have swept up innocent persons who merely were in the wrong place at the wrong time. See, e.g., Owsley, *supra*, at 829–30 (discussing Zachary McCoy and Jorge Molina who were both falsely accused until obtaining attorneys to defend them). It is only a matter of time before innocent people suffer unjustified police scrutiny or worse due to what they have searched, or put another way, due to what they have thought.

C. AI Chatbots

The emerging and growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in many aspects of life is the newest frontier of large database search techniques. Rob. T. Lee, *AI Chat Data Is History's Most Thorough Record of Enterprise Secrets*, Dark Reading (Oct. 17, 2025), <https://perma.cc/4YP7-Z3US>; Nils Gilman, *If You Tell ChatGPT Your Secrets, Will They Be Kept Safe?*, N.Y. Times (Nov. 10, 2025), <https://perma.cc/698D-XKDP>. ChatGPT use has grown faster than any consumer software application in history, and it is used by roughly 700 million people weekly, many of them minors. The youngest generations will probably not learn to “search” at all, but “chat.” Jennifer King et al., *User Privacy and Large Language Models: An Analysis of Frontier Developers' Privacy Policies*, 8 Ass'n for Advancement of A.I./Ass'n for Computing Machinery Conf. on AI, Ethics & Soc. 1465 (2025); Junfeng Jiao et al., *LLMs and Childhood Safety: Identifying Risks and Proposing a Protection Framework for Safe Child-LLM Interaction* 12 (Urb. Info. Lab, Univ. of Tex., Working Paper DOI: 10.48550, 2025). All this use generates an ocean of data in the form of saved conversations, an irresistible one through which to drag law enforcement nets.

Traditional searches based on individualized suspicion are already happening. *See e.g.*, Jill Cowan & Valerie B. Ramsey, *Who Is Jonathan Rinderknecht? What We Know About the Palisades Fire*, N.Y. Times (Oct. 8, 2025), <https://perma.cc/EK4D-FG8U>; Aff. at 10, Compl., *United States v. Rinderknecht*, No. 2:25-mj-06103 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2025), <https://perma.cc/HB5U-YHSA>. It is only a matter of time before reverse searches follow, if they have not happened already.

Reverse searches through chat data—e.g., “who chatted about lighting a building on fire in this area and time?”—will trawl through the unguarded and raw thoughts of millions. Unlike a diary, chatbots do not just receive the thoughts of the user, but they are designed to adapt to them, elicit them, and anticipate them. The interactive nature of chatbots encourages private disclosures because users respond to the life-like aspect of a chatbot, even if they know, at some level, that it is not a human companion or adviser. Emmelyn A. J. Croes et al., *Digital Confessions: The Willingness to Disclose Intimate Information to a Chatbot and Its Impact on Emotional Well-Being*, 36 *Interacting with Comput.*, 279 (2024). This leads many people to lower their guards as they chat, responding to what feels like a free-flowing conversation.

Moreover, chatbot conversations can be about highly sensitive topics involving intimate thoughts. A full list would overwhelm, but users engage chatbots as: financial advisors; doctors; lawyers; spiritual advisors; companions and confidants; role-players and fantasy facilitators; and more. *See, e.g.*, Gina Kolata, *A.I. Is Making Doctors Answer a Question: What Are They Really Good For?*, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2026), <https://perma.cc/VN8B-CFMB> (chatbots as doctors); *United States v. Heppner*, No. 25-CR-503-JSR, 2026 WL 436479, at *1–*4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026) (as lawyers); Lauren Jackson, *Finding God in the App Store*, N.Y. Times (Sept. 14, 2025), <https://perma.cc/3ZE9-Y2S3> (as spiritual advisors).

The last two categories, confidants and role-players, raise special concerns about children, teens, and young adults. A BYU study has shown that nearly one in three young adult men and one in four young adult women shared that they have chatted with an

AI boyfriend or girlfriend. Brian J. Willoughby et al., *Counterfeit Connections: The Rise of Romantic AI Companions and AI Sexualized Media Among the Rising Generation*, BYU Wheatley Inst., at 7 (2025), <https://perma.cc/7P43-TGT4>. Young people are especially likely to use chatbots for imaginative role play that may inspire them to make intimate and impulsive disclosures. Seventy-two percent of teens say they have used AI chatbots as companions. Ryan McBain, *Teens Are Using Chatbots as Therapists. That's Alarming*, N.Y. Times (Aug. 25, 2025), <https://perma.cc/88FK-D9YZ>. These interactions pose a special risk because the “blurring of the distinction between fantasy and reality is especially potent for young people . . . Tweens and teens have a greater penchant for acting impulsively, comparing themselves with peers and challenging social boundaries.” John Sanford, *Why AI Companions and Young People Can Make for a Dangerous Mix*, Stanford Med. (Aug. 27, 2025), <https://perma.cc/TZ7X-6CX8>. Many teens turn to chatbots for mental health support—perhaps one in eight, according to one survey—creating a permanent digital record of their unguarded thoughts without the privacy protections afforded patient-therapist communications. McBain, *supra*.

If this Court permits broad geofence queries, prosecutors are likely to explore the dragnet possibilities of conducting reverse searches of chatbot data, as they have with keyword search data. Rather than obtain information about a particular suspect’s chats, investigators might request chats about the circumstances of the crime or its location, raising the specter of revealing highly private, innocent chats that may superficially match a search query, but are

instead the products of fantasy, role play, hyperbole, or curiosity.

D. Cloud Searches

Individuals and businesses have increasingly embraced cloud storage over the past decade-plus, largely because of its convenience. Disclosures from some of the biggest cloud providers suggest that the total user base numbers in the billions. Google Cloud Blog, *Building the Industry's Best Agentic AI Ecosystem with Partners* (Apr. 9, 2025), <https://perma.cc/V42B-5BUJ> (indicating over 3 billion global users for Google Workspaces); Press Release, Apple, Inc., *Apple Reports First Quarter Results* (Jan. 29, 2026), <https://perma.cc/SP87-QZMF> (stating there are 2.5 billion active Apple devices); Michael Levin & Josh Lowitz, *An Update on Apple Services – iCloud Still Leads the Way*, Consumer Intel. Rsch. Partners Apple Report (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://perma.cc/7WLE-TRXG> (70% of recent U.S. Apple device buyers report paying for the upgraded tier of iCloud storage in the most recent quarter); Dropbox, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 20, 2026) (stating Dropbox has over 700 million registered users).

The kinds of data stored in the cloud are comprehensive, sensitive, and personal. Apple automatically stores data including a user's passwords, financial transactions, travel history from connected GPS apps, photos, email messages, personal notes and reminders, calendars, contacts, and work or personal documents in its cloud. Apple, *Introduction to iCloud*, in *iCloud User Guide*, <https://perma.cc/K89C-YS2C> (last visited Feb. 27, 2026). An analysis of thirteen billion files stored in public cloud environments found that over thirty percent of cloud data assets contained sensitive information, including social security numbers, credit

card numbers, and other types of personally identifiable information. PaloAlto Networks, *The State of Cloud Data Security 2023* (2023), <https://perma.cc/F6G2-Y44J>. A 2020 user survey concluded that a significant portion of U.S. users store sensitive information in the cloud, including office documents (thirty-five percent), passwords and log-in data (twenty-seven percent), and financial information (seventeen percent). Martin Armstrong, *What's in the Cloud?*, Statista Global Consumer Survey (Sept. 30, 2021), <https://perma.cc/3Q6E-STA5>. Surveys suggest that people trust the security and privacy of the cloud, especially when their employers bolster the legitimacy of the cloud through professional use. Raluca Budiu, *Mental Models for Cloud-Storage Systems*, Nielsen Norman Grp. (Nov. 24, 2019), <https://perma.cc/32WT-57LK>.

While we do not know the extent to which law enforcement has attempted to use reverse warrants to search the vast stores of information held by cloud storage providers, warrant applications have been filed in the traditional direction to compel disclosure of content stored in a particular, specified individual's cloud storage account. *See, e.g., United States v. Ray*, 541 F. Supp. 3d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (upholding warrant to search defendant's iCloud account for communications, photos, and videos connecting him to specified crimes); *United States v. Pilling*, 721 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1118–19 (D. Idaho 2024) (reviewing warrants to search the defendant's Google and iCloud accounts for “evidence, contraband, fruits, and/or instrumentalities of violations” of federal law). It has also become routine for the police to order providers of cloud-based email services to produce a specified user's email messages. *See United States v. Warshak*, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that email

users enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails stored with a provider).

The Court's ruling in this case may embolden law enforcement to begin searching our online files in reverse. Tax agents might ask a cloud service to search all its hosted accounts for tax forms indicating a particular form of tax fraud. The FBI investigating a government whistleblower might ask Dropbox to find draft copies of a letter sent to Congress or to the Washington Post. Homeland Security agents might ask Google to search email accounts for messages with file attachments containing photos taken at a protest. Police might ask Apple to search iCloud for any photos or videos taken of an arrest that garnered public attention.

E. People and Object Recognition in Video and Image Surveillance

The world is increasingly awash in cameras, creating a constant stream of still and moving images from public and private spaces, much of it stored or backed up into the cloud. Powerful machine learning algorithms allow this data to be searched, opening the possibility of traditional and reverse searches through this visual chronicle of all of our lives.

Today's digital cameras are used to create billions of new photos and hundreds of thousands of hours of video on a daily basis. T.J. Thomson et. al., *Visual Mis/disinformation in Journalism and Public Communications: Current Verification Practices, Challenges, and Future Opportunities*, 16 *Journalism Prac.* 938, 940 (2020) (indicating that at least 3.2 billion photos and 720,000 hours of video are created each day). Many of these cameras are handheld or installed in place by private actors. Homeowners place cameras in their doorbells, on their car dashboards,

inside their nurseries, and in their bird feeders, to say nothing of the cameras that are part of our cellphones. Commercial buildings install cameras on the corners of structures and in interior hallways. Public actors install cameras as well, from cameras in buses to law enforcement agencies sending cameras aloft on planes and drones. *See, e.g., Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep't*, 2 F.4th 330 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (discussing surveillance program that involved flying planes over Baltimore that took highly detailed images of nearly ninety percent of the city for up to twelve hours a day, which could be subsequently searched to track people's movements).

Many of these images end up stored in data centers and accessible to corporate cloud providers, as discussed above.

Meanwhile, computer science has rendered all of this imagery searchable. Facial recognition and object identification algorithms have dramatically improved in the last few decades. *See* Pratyusha Ria Kalluri et al., *Computer-Vision Research Powers Surveillance Technology*, 643 *Nature* 73 (2025) (study of computer vision research paper and patents, and discussing improvements in object recognition that have also been used to improve human-recognition models). When paired with large image datasets—for example, a database of video doorbell recordings—it is not difficult to imagine a reverse search to identify people or other objects across, say, an entire neighborhood. *See* Jennifer Pattison Tuohy, *Ring Cancels Its Partnership with Flock Safety After Surveillance Backlash*, *The Verge* (Feb. 12, 2026), <https://perma.cc/Q25P-YCCC>; *see also* Jason Koebler, *Leaked Email Suggests Ring Plans to Expand “Search Party” Surveillance Beyond Dogs*, 404 *Media* (Feb. 18, 2026), <https://perma.cc/KH2P-SXKG>.

What could reverse image searching at that scale accomplish? Many photos are time- and location-stamped, and hence can be woven into a digital collage. For example, one might search for all photos that capture a particular location during an interval of time. This could replicate an ordinary geofence search, but with the possibility of photographically identifying people who were there but did not have a location-tracking device with them.

One could also imagine reverse “association” searches, searches for photos or videos of anyone who was depicted near a person or item of interest. *See generally* Deven R. Desai, *Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding*, 90 *Notre Dame L. Rev.* 579 (2014). Rather than asking “who was here during this time” (a geofence query), an association search might ask “who came into contact with this person or knows them?” Such searches would create a chilling effect on who people chose to associate with and would facilitate guilt by association. Jean Tirole, *Digital Dystopia*, 111 *Am. Econ. Rev.* 2007 (2021). The latter effects would be multiplied by the use of AI tools for predictive social graphing, which can be used to infer a person’s First Amendment-protected decisions to talk to and be with other people. *See* Alicia Solow-Niderman, *Information Privacy and the Inference Economy*, 117 *Nw. U. L. Rev.* 357 (2022).

Finally, researchers have shown that facial recognition technology, and many other forms of modern machine learning, are plagued with bias. *See, e.g.,* Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, *Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification*, 81 *Mach. Learning Rsch.* 87 (2018) (finding error rates in three leading gender classification systems of up to 35% for darker skinned

females versus below 1% for lighter-skinned males); Patrick Grother et al., Nat'l Inst. Stds. & Tech., *Internal Rep. 8280, Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic Effects* 2–3 (2019), <https://perma.cc/6THV-EVQL> (reporting as much as 100 times more false positive errors for black face matches compared to white face matches). Powering reverse searches with biased algorithms will place disproportionate burdens on members of minority groups. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, *Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment*, 105 Minn. L. Rev. 1105 (2021); Clare Garvie & Laura Moy, *America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the United States*, Geo. Ctr. on Priv. & Tech. (May 16, 2019), <https://perma.cc/DG38-HV7A>.

F. What Comes Next: Capturing and Commodifying Human Experience

A significant swath of the material wealth and innovative brilliance of modern America is directed at finding untapped repositories of human experience, rendering it into data gathered in the cloud, and analyzing it for the benefit of users and third parties. Some scholars describe our economy as built upon as a system of surveillance capitalism. See Shoshana Zuboff, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power* (2019). Less-critical industry watchers refer to this as frictionless integration or data liquidity.

Whatever you call it, the result is the same. Companies continue to seek out everything we say and do, everyone we know and meet, and everywhere we go, and turn that information into vast online repositories. These large databases create a substantial risk that the government will dip into different streams of deeply personal communications,

content, and other evidence of speech, association, belief, and behavior.

In addition to the examples addressed above, consider the next generation of data gathering innovations arriving in your home soon. Each has the potential to generate vast new pools of sensitive information the police might target for their next reverse search. Wearable devices bring internet connectivity, cameras, microphones, and other sensors, to glasses, pendants, and clothing. Petar Radanliev, *Privacy, Ethics, Transparency, and Accountability in AI Systems for Wearable Devices*, *Frontiers in Digit. Health* (2025) (“Wearable sensors collect a vast amount of personal data, which can be helpful for personal health and productivity. However, when fed into [artificial intelligence] and [machine learning] algorithms, this data can be used to profile individuals without explicit consent. This can lead to invasive targeted advertising, increased insurance premiums based on health data, or even surveillance by governments or companies.”). Smartwatches and fitness bands monitor heart rates, motion, sweat, and skin temperature, revealing detailed records of user activity. Kavous Salehzadeh Niksirat et al., *Wearable Activity Trackers: A Survey on Utility, Privacy, and Security*, 56 *ACM Comput. Surv.* 1, 11–12 (2024) (summarizing categories of information that can be obtained or inferred from wearable activity trackers, including: mental-health states and disease indicators; specific user activities such as eating, drinking, or smoking; personality traits, mood, and handwriting; and precise user location). And brainwave sensors placed near, or even surgically inside, the brain will soon monitor traces of what we think and how we feel. Patrick Magee et al., *Beyond Neural Data: Cognitive Biometrics and Mental*

Privacy, 112 *Neuron* 3017, 3017 (2024) (“Recent advancements in artificial intelligence, particularly deep learning applied to neural recordings, have further demonstrated the potential to establish privacy-sensitive statistical correlations between neural data and particular mental states. This capability, while beneficial for personalized health and wellness applications, also poses unique challenges to mental privacy, potentially leading to unwanted surveillance and manipulation if not properly regulated.”).

What all of these advances have in common is that they will render suddenly legible the private details of individual lives that have never been externally knowable before, much less stored in the data centers of distant corporations. Lower courts are sure to struggle even with traditional search requests about some of this data: what was user 24601 saying, listening to, or thinking last Monday at 2pm? Deciding what to do about *reverse* searches of such data—who experienced a sudden increase in heart rate Saturday evening?—will be even more fraught, unless this Court takes this opportunity to recognize strict constitutional guardrails around those novel forms of surveillance.

III. Implications

As the Court considers the geofence warrant in this case specifically, it should be mindful of the ripple effects its opinion may have. If the Court places too low an “obstacle in the way of a too permeating police surveillance,” *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 305 (quoting *Di Re*, 332 U.S. at 595), it will embolden law enforcement to seek reverse searches in other sensitive data stores, including the ones we have surveyed in Part II.

If the Court declares that reverse searches are general searches, it will break the automatic turn-key inheritance law enforcement agencies enjoy for these pools of information. To be clear, the police will continue to enjoy a golden age of surveillance, thanks to the way cases like *Carpenter* seem to permit traditional searches through this same data with probable cause and a warrant or clear warrant exception.

But if the Court decides not to prohibit reverse searches outright, it can and should articulate restrictions on their use that address their reverse nature. Most fundamentally, the Court should focus on the requirements of particularity and individualized suspicion that are so often at odds with reverse searches. *Ybarra*, 444 U.S. at 91; *Carpenter*, 585 U.S. at 317. This will require courts to seriously consider the rights of the many innocent or completely unrelated third parties who will have their personal information revealed without proper protection or justification. In other words, courts must attend to the false positives—the people who just happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, the people who just happened to search for the unlucky phrase, or the person who just happened to say the unfortunate thing to the AI chatbot. Courts must also consider the person who was not even in the wrong place at the wrong time, but who erroneously appears to have been due to messy data, a noisy GPS chip, or buggy code.

We may be out of practice in this kind of analysis. With more traditional searches, the incidental invasion of the privacy of third parties can be thought justified by the particularity and probable cause supporting the underlying warrant. *See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily*, 436 U.S. 547, 559 (1978). But when the warrant at issue is indiscriminate by its nature,

third-party privacy is put directly at issue by the government's search strategy and must be protected more aggressively. *E.g.*, *In re Search of Info. that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google LLC*, 579 F. Supp. 3d 62, 82–85 (D.D.C. 2021) (carefully analyzing the effect on a geofence search on third parties); *see also Zurcher*, 436 U.S. at 560 (indicating traditional searches may be unreasonable even if they are “supported by a warrant issued on probable cause and properly identifying the place to be searched and the property to be seized”).

Beyond strictly policing particularity and individualized suspicion, there are other safeguards courts can impose during the warrant process to protect privacy and limit police power. A key lesson of *Berger v. New York* is that the constitutional requirements of particularity and probable cause can sometimes only be met by reaching into a broader judicial toolkit. 388 U.S. at 55–60. When a novel technological threat, “[b]y its very nature . . . involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in scope,” *id.* at 56, it “imposes ‘a heavier responsibility on this Court in its supervision of the fairness of procedures.’” *Id.* (quoting *Osborn v. United States*, 385 U.S. 323, 329 n.7 (1966)). When the novel technological threat to privacy was voice wiretaps, this Court endorsed protections such as time limits, expiry dates, and limits on the number of renewals. *Id.* at 59.

As this Court follows the lesson of *Berger* and begins to craft “adequate judicial supervision or protective procedures,” *id.* at 60, to address reverse searches, it should keep in mind the many forms that such searches take.

One measured and sensible limit would be to impose the requirement of necessity, so that invasive dragnet powers should be exercised only as last

resorts. The government should not be permitted to turn to geofence queries, or other reverse searches, unless and until they have tried to use other, less invasive investigative steps that failed to solve the crime. *Cf.* 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (requiring proof that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous” to obtain a wiretap order); *United States v. Torres*, 751 F.2d 875, 884 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring similar proof under the Fourth Amendment for conducting video surveillance not covered by the Wiretap Act).

The Court should also consider limiting geofence queries to serious crimes rather than trivial ones. *In re Search of Info. Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, as Further Described in Attachment A*, No. 20-MC-297, 2020 WL 5491763, at *8 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2020) (“The government’s undisciplined and overuse of this investigative technique in run-of-the-mill cases that present no urgency or imminent danger poses concerns to our collective sense of privacy and trust in law enforcement officials.”).

Finally, in ruling on the substantive question in this case, the Court should signal how the reasoning applies to other types of reverse warrants. Otherwise, lower courts will likely rely on the good faith exception for each new kind of reverse search that emerges because their “legality . . . [is] unclear.” *United States v. Chatrue*, 590 F. Supp. 3d 901, 937 (E.D. Va. 2022), *aff’d*, 107 F.4th 319 (4th Cir. 2024), *on reh’g en banc*, 136 F.4th 100 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting *United States v. McLamb*, 880 F.3d 685, 691 (4th Cir. 2018)). Numerous courts have refused to suppress geofence warrants on the grounds that the search technology is novel, and hence mistakes in its use should be excused and should not trigger suppression. *See, e.g., id.*

at 936–41; *United States v. Smith*, 110 F.4th 817, 838–40 (5th Cir. 2024), *cert. denied*, 146 S. Ct. 356 (2025).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, *amici* urge the Court to reverse the judgment of the court below.

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