The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Carpenter v. United States has set a course for rethinking Fourth Amendment rights in the digital age. It is the third bright star in the last seven years, marking a welcome and long overdue departure from the so-called “third-party doctrine” that has limited privacy rights for the last four decades. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that police must usually get a warrant to access historical “cell site location information” (CSLI) — geographic data held by a cellphone service provider about where a device has connected to its network. It is a major win for privacy rights and it shines the way forward for future Fourth Amendment challenges: digital is different.

The question becomes, different how? And how far might Carpenter extend?

The case involves 127 days’ worth of Timothy Carpenter’s historical CSLI, obtained without a warrant or probable cause, and used to convict him for a string of robberies. On one level, the Court’s decision to require a warrant for such long-term location tracking is not surprising. In United States v. Jones, the Court ruled that 28 days of GPS tracking required a warrant.\footnote{In Riley v. California, the Court required a warrant to search a cellphone incident to arrest, signaling its sensitivity to the wealth of private data stored on digital devices, including historic location information.\footnote{The big wrinkle in Carpenter is that the police obtained the CSLI directly from the cellphone service provider, a third-party, instead of searching the defendant’s phone or using a GPS tracker.}} The doctrine comes from two cases, United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, involving access to bank deposit slips and landline phone call records, respectively.\footnote{In both instances, the Court held that a warrant is not required because the defendant “assumed the risk” that such business records “would be divulged to police.”\footnote{But compelled to follow Miller and Smith, most lower courts to consider the question found no privacy interest in CSLI because it had been conveyed to a third party.\footnote{The big question in Carpenter was whether the Court would continue to apply the third-party doctrine in the digital age or somehow limit its reach.}}}

For the last 40 years, the involvement of a third party has triggered the “third-party doctrine,” a rule dictating that there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information voluntarily shared with a “third party.” The doctrine faces mounting criticism in recent years as more of daily life moves online and into the hands of third parties, including internet and cellphone service providers.\footnote{Indeed, as Justice Sotomayor concurred in Jones, the rule is “ill-suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”}

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Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, declined to “mechanically” apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI, describing it as “qualitatively different” from the records in Smith and Miller, and “an entirely different species of business record.” Instead of operating as a binary switch, the Court instructs, the doctrine should take into account “the nature of the particular documents sought” to determine whether there is a legitimate “expectation of privacy” concerning their contents. Here, the Court found that obtaining more than six days of CSLI requires a warrant, absent fact-specific exceptions like exigency.

This is a big doctrinal shift away from how many courts have understood and applied the third-party rule to date. Far from considering the underlying contents or nature of the information at issue, the doctrine has usually worked as a complete bar to Fourth Amendment protection for information shared with third parties. As Justice Thomas says in his dissent, Smith and Miller “announced a categorical rule: Once you disclose information to third parties, you forfeit any reasonable expectation of privacy you might have had in it.” “This is true,” says Justice Kennedy in a separate dissent, “even when the records contain personal and sensitive information.” Instead, Kennedy continues, the Court appears to establish a balancing test for each “subjectively different category” of information.

The majority, however, says that they are simply “declin[ing] to extend Smith and Miller to cover these novel circumstances.” As a result, the third-party doctrine poses no obstacle to finding a privacy interest in 127 days of CSLI, an “all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”

Relying on two concurrences in Jones, the Court finds CSLI to be intensely private information. It provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. CSLI contains the “privacies of life” and present even greater concerns than the GPS tracking in Jones because, building on Riley, a cellphone is “almost a feature of the human anatomy” that follows its owner into “private residences, doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” It also allows the government to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts,” giving the police “access to a category of information otherwise unknowable.” It is increasingly precise, “approaching GPS-level precision.” The result is “a detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years” that implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in Smith and Miller.

Carpenter further distinguishes CSLI from the records in Smith and Miller by recognizing that CSLI “is not truly ‘shared’ as one normally understands the term.” Instead, the Court reasons, cellphones have become “indispensable to participation in modern society”; they create CSLI “without any affirmative act” but also with “[y]nearly any activity”; and there is “no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data” short of disconnecting the phone from the network. In sum, there is no alternative to creating and conveying CSLI; it is a reality of the digital age that should not be confused with “assum[ing] the risk of turning over a comprehensive dossier of [one’s] physical movements” to the police.

Of course, CSLI is far from the only type of pervasive, invasive third-party data that works this way. Today, third-party service providers keep records detailing cellphone use, web browsing history, and most online activities. Online retailers keep track of what a user has purchased or merely perused. App makers log how users interact with their programs, and often much more. Companies like Google, Apple, and Facebook host private files and photos in the “cloud” while maintaining a frighteningly detailed log of user activity, both on and off their sites. Emailing, tweeting, instant messaging, surfing, searching, liking, and downloading all create an inescapable trail of third-party records that may raise constitutional concerns on par with CSLI.

Justice Roberts calls CSLI “unique” and insists that the Court’s decision is a “narrow one,” declining to express a view on real-time CSLI or “tower dumps.” But as Justice Breyer quipped at oral argument, “This is an open box. We know not where we go.” CSLI may be a different “species” of third-party records, but like Darwin in the Galapagos, the Court may soon begin to discover other new species of protected data that implicate the same “basic Fourth Amendment concerns” as CSLI and demand a warrant.

Even the use of “conventional” surveillance tools, like security cameras, which Carpenter says it does not “call into question,” may be open to challenge if used in conjunction with other new technologies like real-time facial recognition or automatic license plate readers. Using such software on a dense network of cameras could raise the same privacy concerns around location tracking that motivated the majority in both Carpenter and Jones.

None of this was lost on the Court’s four dissenters, Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Kennedy would have continued to apply Smith and Miller in full force, fearing “undue restrictions” on law enforcement. He writes that property law principles should form a “baseline” for determining reasonable expectations of privacy, and that CSLI belongs to cellphone service providers, not individual users. He also chides the majority for not “explain[ing] what makes something a different category of information.” According to Kennedy, Carpenter provides no principled way of telling whether credit card records, digital wallet data, or cellphone call details should receive the same treatment as CSLI. The same is true, he continues, for IP address information and website browsing history. Kennedy meant it as a warning, but it could easily double as a to-do list for defense lawyers and privacy advocates.

Justice Thomas looks beyond Smith and Miller and identifies the source of the problem as Katz v. United States, which gave rise to the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Katz is “a failed experiment” that the Court is “dutybound” to reconsider, Thomas writes, arguing that it strays from the text of the Fourth Amendment and has become unworkable. Like Justice Kennedy, Thomas would tie Fourth Amendment rights to property law. Thomas finds it telling that Carpenter “cites no property law in briefs to this Court” and “does not explain how he has a property right in the companies’ records under the law of any jurisdiction at any point in American history.”

Likewise, Justice Alito finds “no plausible ground” to maintain that CSLI qualifies as Carpenter’s “papers” or “effects” for Fourth Amendment purposes. He also sounds the alarm about a potential “upheaval” in the way grand jury subpoenas work. Carpenter is “revolutionary,” according to Alito, because it imposes a probable cause standard on the compulsory production of CSLI. And “nothing stops its logic from sweeping much further.” One possibility, Alito concludes, is that “all other orders compelling the production of documents will require a demonstration of probable cause” if they contain sensitive personal information. Whether this is a warning or an invitation likely depends on one’s perspective.

Finally, Justice Gorsuch joins Justice
Thomas in criticizing the Katz framework that gave rise to the third-party doctrine. But unlike the other dissenters, Gorsuch is hostile to the third-party doctrine and concerned about its implications in the digital age. Indeed, one might mistake the Gorsuch dissent for a concurrence. “What’s left of the Fourth Amendment?” Gorsuch asks, noting that “[e]ven our most private documents — those that, in other eras, we would have locked safely in a desk drawer or destroyed — now reside on third-party servers.” Gorsuch also parts ways with Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito in suggesting that CSLI could qualify as a cellphone user’s own “papers” or “effects.” Instead, he points to “positive law” — federal legislation giving customers at least some legal right to include, exclude, and control the use of their data. Gorsuch speculates that such “positive law” interests “might even rise to the level of a property right.”

Nonetheless, Justice Gorsuch “reluctantly” concludes that Carpenter “forfeit[ed]” this “most promising line of argument.” He faults Carpenter for focusing only on the Katz test and failing to “invoke the law of property or any analogies to the common law.” Carpenter’s “discussion of positive law rights in cell-site data was cursory,” Gorsuch writes, suggesting that state law might provide an additional source of customer rights.

The takeaway from the Carpenter dissents is that there is more than one way to assemble a majority on digital privacy issues. Justice Gorsuch, for one, provides a road map to get his vote the next time around. “Even if Katz may still supply one way to prove a Fourth Amendment interest,” he writes, “it has never been the only way.” Similarly, a strong property law argument would likely hold sway with Justices Gorsuch, Alito, and Thomas.

In the coming months, NACDL’s Fourth Amendment Center will provide additional resources on making the most out of Carpenter. In the meantime, advocates would be wise to present any and every Fourth Amendment theory that might fit their facts. Carpenter itself relies on a shadow majority in Jones — the Sotomayor and Alito concurrences examining privacy expectations — not the Court’s official trespass theory. At the same time, a persuasive property law or “positive law” argument could have strengthened Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment interest and attracted votes that could spell the difference in future cases. Indeed, as Justice Gorsuch cautions, “[i]n[eglecting more traditional approaches may mean failing to vindicate the full protections of the Fourth Amendment.”

Overall, Carpenter should not be underestimated for its potential to shape the future of the Fourth Amendment. Most immediately, it frees lower courts from the dead hand of Smith and Miller to protect data of comparable “depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach” to CSLI. Building on Jones and Riley, Carpenter also makes it clear that the Court is willing to reconsider old doctrines that do not fit with the realities of the digital age. In that sense, Carpenter caps a trilogy of cases that may spell a welcome rebirth of Fourth Amendment rules for years to come.

NACDL, together with the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brennan Center for Justice, Constitution Project and National Association of Federal Defenders, filed a joint amicus brief in support of the petitioner in Carpenter.

Notes
3. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014) (“Historic location information is a standard feature on many smartphones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.”).
5. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
8. See United States v. Thompson, 866 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013).
10. Id. at *11.
11. Id. at *9, n.3; *15.
12. One notable exception is email. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–286 (6th Cir. 2010) (email “is the technological scion of tangible mail” and it would “defy common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment protection.”). The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on this issue, although both the justices and the Department of Justice presumed the propriety of a warrant requirement at oral argument in Carpenter.
13. Carpenter, at *56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at *16 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at *9.
16. Id. at *9.
17. Id. at *7 (“The Court decided [Jones] based on the government’s physical trespass of the vehicle. 565 U.S. at 404–405. At the same time, five justices agreed that related privacy concerns would be raised by, for example, ‘surreptitiously activating a stolen vehicle detection system’ in Jones’s car to track Jones himself, or conducting GPS tracking of his cellphone.” Id., at 426, 428 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
18. Id. at *9.
19. Id. at *9-10.
20. Id. at *10.
21. Id. at *11.
22. Id. at *12.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *9, *12.
25. Id. at *13.
27. Id. at *16 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28. Id. at *29.
29. Id.
30. Id. at *28.
32. Carpenter, at *36 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at *53 (Alito, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at *51.
35. Id. at *56 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at *67.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *67 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at *7.
42. Id. at *67 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at *15.

About the Author
Michael Price is NACDL’s Senior Litigation Counsel.

Michael Price
NACDL
Washington, DC
202-465-7615

Email
mprice@nacdl.org

Website
www.nacdl.org

Twitter
@NACDL