What follows is a synopsis of articles of impeachment adopted in each of the fifteen impeachments in the nation's history, as well as Senate votes on each of these articles. For quicker reference, this information is further condensed into a chart at the end.
William Blount
United States Senator (Tenn.)
Articles of Impeachment Adopted: January 29, 1798
Senate Action: January 11, 1799
Article 1: In 1797, while the United States was officially neutral in the war between Spain
and Great Britain, Blount, "designing and intending to disturb the peace and
tranquility of the United States, and to violate and infringe the neutrality
thereof," conspired to conduct a hostile military expedition against Spanish
territory in Florida and Louisiana and to conquer such territory for Great Britain.
Article 2: Despite a treaty between the United States and Spain by which both nations
agreed to "maintain peace and harmony among the several Indian nations"
inhabiting the Floridas, and to restrain the Indian nations within their borders
from attacking the subjects or natives of the other, Blount conspired to "excite
the Creek and Cherokee nations of Indians . . . to commence hostilities against
Spanish subjects and territory.
Article 3: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 & 2, Blount
conspired and contrived "to alienate and divert the confidence" of the Indian
nations from Benjamin Hawkins, the lawfully appointed federal agent for Indian
affairs.
Article 4: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 & 2, Blount
conspired and contrived to seduce James Carey, the official federal interpreter
to the Cherokee nation, from the duty and trust of his office and to engage him
to assist in the promotion and execution of Blount's criminal designs.
Article 5: To accomplish the criminal designs described in Articles 1 & 2, Blount
conspired and contrived to diminish and impair the confidence of the Cherokee
nation in the government of the United States, and to foment discontent and
disaffection between them, in relation to treaties by which the two agreed to
ascertain and mark a boundary line between them.
In July 1797, after receiving a message from President Adams describing Senator Blount's
conduct, the Senate expelled him by a vote of 25-1. The impeachment came the following
year. The Senate ultimately dismissed the case after it ruled by a vote of 14-11 that a Senator
was not a civil officer subject to impeachment.
Article 1: Pickering, with the intent to evade a federal law, ordered the ship Eliza, its
contents, and some cables to be delivered to a claimant of such property despite
the claimant's failure to provide a certificate that the applicable tonnage duties
had been paid.
Article 2: Pickering, with the intent to defeat the just claims of the United States, refused
the hear testimony of witnesses offered to show that the ship Eliza and its
contents were properly forfeited to the United States, and instead ordered the
property returned to the private claimant.
Article 3: Pickering, "disregarding the authority of the laws and wickedly meaning and
intending to injure the revenues of the United States and thereby impair their
public credit" refused to allow an appeal of his ruling regarding ownership of the
ship Eliza and its contents.
Article 4: Pickering appeared in the bench "in a state of total intoxication, produced by the
free and intemperate use of intoxicating liquors," and "in a most profane and
indecent manner, [did] invoke the name of the Supreme Being, to the evil
example of the good citizens of the United States."
Judge Pickering did not appear at the impeachment trial, but his son suggested to the Senate
that the Judge was insane at the time of the Eliza case and remained so. The Senate ultimately
convicted Judge Pickering on each count by a vote of 19-7. It then voted 20-6 to remove
Pickering from office.
Article 1: During the treason trial of John Fries, Chase "conduct[ed] himself in a manner
highly arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust" by: (1) delivering a written legal
opinion tending to prejudice the jury against the defendant before defense
counsel had been heard; (2) prohibiting defense counsel from citing to English
authorities and United States statutes counsel deemed illustrative; and (3)
barring defense counsel from addressing the jury on the law. This conduct
deprived Fries of his constitutional rights and disgraced the character of the
American bench.
Article 2: "Prompted by a similar spirit of persecution and injustice" during the libel trial
of James Callendar, and with the intent to oppress and procure a conviction,
Chase overruled an objection to seating as a juror a person who had made
already up his mind that the defendant was guilty.
Article 3: During the Callendar trial, "with the intent to oppress and procure a conviction,"
Chase excluded testimony of a material defense witness on the pretense that the
witness could not prove the truth of the whole of the allegedly libelous material,
even though the charge embraced more than one fact.
Article 4: Chase's conduct throughout the Callendar trial was marked by "manifest
injustice, partiality, and intemperance" by: (1) requiring defense counsel to
submit in writing to the court all questions they planned to ask a witness;
(2) refusing to postpone the trial despite a proper request based on the absence
of a material defense witness; (3) being rude and contemptuous of defense
counsel and falsely insinuating that they wished to excite public fears; (4)
making repeated and vexatious interruptions of defense counsel, inducing them
to abandon their cause and their client; and (5) expressing undue concern,
"unbecoming even a public prosecutor," for the conviction of the accused.
Article 5: Chase illegally ordered the arrest of Callendar even though he was not charged
with a capital offense.
Article 6: Chase illegally tried Callendar during the same term in which he was indicted.
Article 7: Disregarding the duties of his office, Chase "did descend from the dignity of a
judge and stoop to the level of informer" by refusing to discharge a grand jury
and advising it of allegedly libelous publications with the intention of procuring
the prosection of the printer, "thereby degrading his high judicial functions and
tending to impair the public confidence" in the tribunals of justice.
Article 8: Disregarding the duties and dignity of his judicial character, Chase delivered to
a Maryland grand jury "an intemperate and inflammatory political harangue,
with the intent the excite the fears and resentment" of the grand jury against the
their state government and constitution.
The Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 16 18 Article 2 10 24 Article 3 18 16 Article 4 18 16 Article 5 0 34 Article 6 4 30 Article 7 10 24 Article 8 19 15
Because the two-thirds majority required for conviction was lacking on all counts, Justice
Chase was acquitted.
Article: In December of 1825, Judge Peck issued a decree resolving a dispute to certain
territorial lands. While the matter was on appeal to the Supreme Court, Judge
Peck caused to be published in a local newspaper the reasons for his decision.
Counsel for the appellants responded by getting another newspaper to print a
letter in which he identified the errors in Judge Peck's opinion. In response,
Judge Peck, "with intention wrongfully and unjustly to oppress, imprison, and
otherwise injure" appellant's counsel, had counsel arrested, held him in
contempt, ordered him imprisoned for 24 hours, and suspended him from
practicing before the court for 18 months, all "to the great disparagement of
public justice, the abuse of judicial authority, and to the subversion of the
liberties of the people of the United States."
The Senate vote was 21 for guilty, 22 for not guilty. Judge Peck was therefore acquitted.
Article 1: On December 29, 1860 in Nashville, Tennessee, and contrary Humphreys
endeavored by public speech to incite revolt and rebellion against the
Constitution and government of the United States.
Article 2: In 1861, "with the intent to abuse the high trust reposed in him as a judge,"
Humphreys openly and unlawfully supported and advocated the secession of the
State of Tennessee.
Article 3: In 1861 and 1862, Humphreys organized arm rebellion against the United States
and levied war against them.
Article 4: With Jefferson Davis and others, Humphreys conspired to oppose by force the
authority of the government of the United States.
Article 5: With intent to prevent the due administration of the laws of the United States,
Humphreys neglected and refused to hold court, as by law he was required to
do.
Article 6: With intent to subvert the authority of the government of the United States,
Humphreys unlawfully acted as judge of an illegally constituted tribunal within
Tennessee. In connection with this, Humphreys: (1) caused the arrest of one
Perez Dickinson, and required him to swear allegiance to the Confederacy, and
when Perez refused, Humphreys ordered Dickinson to leave the State; (2)
ordered the confiscation of property of citizens of the United States, especially
the property of one Andrew Johnson; and (3) caused the arrest and
imprisonment of citizens of the United States because of their fidelity to their
obligations as citizens and their resistance to the Confederacy.
Article 7: Humphreys, as a judge of the Confederate States of America and with the intent
to injure one William G. Brownlow, ordered his unlawful arrest and
imprisonment.
Judge Humphreys offered no defense and made no appearance either in person or through counsel. The Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 39 0 Article 2 36 1 Article 3 33 4 Article 4 28 10 Article 5 39 0 Article 6(1) 36 1 Article 6(2) 12 24 Article 6(3) 35 1 Article 7 35 1
Based in the guilty verdicts, the Senate then voted 38-0 to remove Judge Humphreys from
office and voted 36-0 to disqualify him from holding in the future any office under the United
States.
President Johnson was the only southern senator not to leave Congress when the South
seceded. Later, as president, he obstructed many of the Radical Reconstruction efforts of
Congress. He removed every military commander in the South who was committed to carrying
out the spirit of the Reconstructions acts. He also denounced Black suffrage and claimed that
some of the Reconstruction Acts, passed over his veto, were unconstitutional.
In March of 1867, apparently fearing that Johnson would remove Secretary of War
Stanton, the only Republican left in the cabinet after the 1866 congressional elections,
Congress passed the Tenure of Office Act. This Act was designed to limit the President's
power to remove subordinate officials without the Senate's consent. It required that all
executive officials appointed with senatorial approval hold office until a successor had been
appointed and confirmed. Thus, until the Senate agreed to a successor, senior executive
officials could not be fired. A partial exception was made for cabinet officers, who were to
hold office only during the term of the President who appointed them and for one month
thereafter.
In August, while Congress was out of session, Johnson suspended Stanton. Although
it was far from clear whether Stanton, who had been appointed by President Lincoln, was truly
covered by the Act, when Congress reconvened in December Johnson sent to the Senate his
reasons for suspending Stanton. He thus implicitly acknowledged that Stanton was protected
by the Act. The Senate declined to concur and Stanton returned to his post. During this
period, the House of Representatives rejected by a vote of 57-108 an attempt to impeach
President Johnson.
On January 30, 1868, Supreme Court Justice Stephen J. Field openly announced that
the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitutional and that the Court would be sure to pronounce
it so. In response, the House of Representatives began an impeachment investigation against
Justice Field. This investigation dropped well into the background when, on February 21st,
President Johnson fired Secretary Stanton. The next day, by a vote of 103-37 the House
instructed the Reconstruction Committee to inquire whether grounds for impeachment existed.
Article 1: On February 21, 1868, Johnson unlawfully issued an order for the removal of
Edwin Stanton from his office as Secretary of War.
Article 2: On February 21, 1868, Johnson unlawfully issued a letter to Major General
Lorenzo Thomas authorizing him to act as Secretary of War ad interim, despite
the lack of a vacancy in that office.
Article 3: On February 21, 1868, while the Senate was in session, Johnson unlawfully
appointed Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War ad interim without the advice
and consent of the Senate.
Article 4: On February 21, 1868, Johnson illegally conspired with General Thomas to
hinder and prevent Secretary of War Stanton from holding his office.
Article 5: On February 21, 1868, Johnson illegally conspired with General Thomas to
prevent and hinder the Tenure of Office Act.
Article 6: On February 21, 1868, Johnson conspired with General Thomas to take
possession of property of the United States Department of War, in violation of
an 1861 Act to define and punish certain conspiracies.
Article 7: On February 21, 1868, Johnson conspired with General Thomas to take
possession of property of the United States Department of War, in violation of
the Tenure of Office Act.
Article 8: On February 21, 1868, with the intent unlawfully to control the disbursements
of the Department of War, and in violation of the Tenure of Office Act, Johnson
delivered a letter to General Thomas authorizing him to take charge of the
Department of War.
Article 9: On February 22, 1868, as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, Johnson
instructed Major General William Emory to disregard and treat as
unconstitutional the Tenure of Office Act, particularly that portion which
required all military orders to be issued through the General of the Army, and
to obey such orders as Johnson may give directly.
Article 10: Johnson attempted "to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and
reproach the Congress of the United States" by delivering loud, intemperate,
inflammatory, and scandalous harangues against the Congress.
Article 11: On August 18, 1866, Johnson delivered a public speech in which he declared
that the 39th Congress was not a lawful Congress of the United States, but a
Congress of only some of them, in an effort to deny the validity of congressional
legislation and the validity of proposed amendments to the Constitution.
On May 16th, the Senate voted on Article 11. The vote was 35-19 for guilty, one vote short
of the two-thirds majority needed for conviction. The Senate then adjourned until May 26th.
On May 26th, the Senate voted on Articles 2 and 3. Again the vote was 35-19. The Senate
then voted to adjourn the impeachment trial and the Chief Justice announced, without
objection, a judgment of acquittal. In early 1875, Johnson was elected to the Senate by the
Tennessee legislature. He served there until his death in July, 1875.
On March 2, 1876, William Belknap resigned his as Secretary of War. The House
nevertheless proceeded to impeach him for his alleged misconduct while in office.
Article 1: On October 8, 1870, Belknap appointed Caleb P. Marsh to maintain a trading
post at Fort Sill. On the same day, Marsh contracted with John S. Evans for
Evans to fill the commission as posttrader at Fort Sill in exchange for a yearly
payment to Marsh of $12,000. On October 10th, at the request of Marsh,
Belknap appointed Evans to maintain the trading establishment at Fort Sill. On
November 2, 1870, and on four more occasions over the next year, Belknap
unlawfully received $1,500 payments from Marsh in consideration of allowing
Evans to maintain a trading establishment at Fort Sill.
Article 2: Belknap, after "willfully, corruptly, and unlawfully" taking $1,500 from Marsh
to permit Evans to maintain a trading post at Fort Sill, corruptly allowed Evans
to maintain that trading post.
Article 3: From October 1870 to December 1875, Belknap received half of every payment
Evans made to Marsh, during which period Belknap, "basely prostituting his
high office to his lust for private gain" continued to allow Evans to serve as
posttrader, all to the great injury of the officers and soldiers of the Army of the
United States.
Article 4: [This article details, in 17 separate specifications, the 17 separate payments,
ranging from $750 to $1,700, Belknap received from Marsh in consideration of
allowing Evans to remain posttrader.]
Article 5: Belknap permitted Evans to remain posttrader until March 2, 1876 despite
knowing that Evans had contracted to pay Marsh for his influence in securing
the appointment; and that, in order to make sure that the payments to Marsh
would continue, Belknap received or caused his wife to receive large sums of
money.
Former Secretary Belknap appeared through counsel, but refused to enter a plea, on the grounds that as a private citizen he was not subject to impeachment. After trial, the Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 35 25 Article 2 36 25 Article 3 36 25 Article 4 36 25 Article 5 37 25
As a result, Mr. Belknap was acquitted. Twenty-two of the Senators who voted to acquit (as
well as two who voted to convict) believed the Senate lacked jurisdiction.
Article 1: On April 20, 1897, knowing that a far less sum was due, and for the purpose
obtaining payment, Swayne made a false claim in the amount of $230 against
the United States for travel expenses relating to holding court in Waco, Texas.
In doing so, he signed a false certificate.
Article 2: Swayne, knowing the rules on reimbursement for expenses, falsely certified that
his expenses in travelling to, holding court in, and returning from Tyler, Texas
in December 1900 were $10 per day for 31 days, for which he received $310,
when in fact his actual expenses were less.
Article 3: Swayne, knowing the rules on reimbursement for expenses, falsely certified that
his expenses in travelling to, holding court in, and returning from Tyler, Texas
in January 1903 were $10 per day for 41 days, for which he received $410,
when in fact his actual expenses were less.
Article 4: In 1893, for the purpose of transporting himself, his family, and his friends from
Delaware to Florida, Swayne unlawfully appropriated to his own use a railroad
car owned by a railroad company which was under receivership in his court. In
addition, and without paying therefor, Swayne was supplied by the receiver with
provisions which he and his friends consumed, as well as the services of a
conductor. Then, in his capacity as judge, Swayne allowed the receiver to claim
these expenses as part of the necessary costs of operating the railroad company.
Article 5: In 1893, for the purpose of transporting himself, his family, and his friends from
Florida to California, Swayne unlawfully appropriated to his own use a railroad
car owned by a railroad company which was under receivership in his court. In
addition, and without paying therefor, Swayne was supplied by the receiver with
provisions which he and his friends consumed, as well as the services of a
conductor. Then, in his capacity as judge, Swayne allowed the receiver to claim
these expenses as part of the necessary costs of operating the railroad company.
Article 6: When Congress altered the boundaries of the northern district of Florida in 1894
in a way that removed Swayne's residence from the district, Swayne did not
acquire a new residence within the district for more than six years, in violation
of a law requiring judges to reside in the district in which they sit.
Article 7: Swayne, "totally disregarding his duty" to reside within the newly defined
district, did not do so for a period of about nine years.
Article 8: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did maliciously and unlawfully" hold an
attorney named E.T. Davis in contempt of court, for which Swayne fined him
$100 and imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 9: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did knowingly and unlawfully" hold an
attorney named E.T. Davis in contempt of court, for which Swayne fined him
$100 and imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 10: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did maliciously and unlawfully" hold an
attorney named Simeon Belden in contempt of court, for which Swayne fined
him $100 and imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 11: On November 12, 1901, Swayne "did knowingly and unlawfully" hold an
attorney named Simeon Belden in contempt of court, for which Swayne fined
him $100 and imprisoned him for ten days.
Article 12: On December 9, 1902, Swayne "did unlawfully and knowingly" hold
W.C. O'Neal in contempt of court, for which Swayne imprisoned him for 60
days.
Judge Swayne was acquitted after the Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 33 49 Article 2 32 50 Article 3 32 50 Article 4 13 69 Article 5 13 69 Article 6 31 51 Article 7 19 63 Article 8 31 51 Article 9 31 51 Article 10 31 51 Article 11 31 51 Article 12 35 47
Article 1: On March 31, 1911, while assigned to the United States Commerce Court,
Archbald induced the Erie Railroad Company, which was a litigant in several
cases before the Commerce Court, to sell him and a partner certain property
owned by a subsidiary corporation. In doing this, Archbald "willfully,
unlawfully, and corruptly took advantage of his official position of a judge" in
order to profit for himself.
Article 2: In August 1911, Archbald willfully, unlawfully, and corruptly used his influence
as a judge of the Commerce Court to induce parties in litigation pending before
the court and before the Interstate Commerce Commission to settle their dispute
by having one party sell two-thirds of its stock to another party.
Article 3: In October 1911, Archbald unlawfully and corruptly used his official position
and influence as a judge of the Commerce Court to cause a litigant before that
court to lease him a culm dump containing large coal deposits.
Article 4: In late 1911 and early 1912, Archbald communicated secretly with the attorney
for one party in a case before the Commerce Court and advised the attorney to
see one of the witnesses and get an explanation and interpretation of the
testimony given by the witness. He then secretly informed the attorney of the
court's discovery of evidence contrary to the statements of the attorney and
advised the attorney to submit additional arguments. Archbald did this all
without the knowledge or consent of the Commerce Court.
Article 5: In 1904, Archbald wrongfully attempted to use his influence to assist Frederick
Warnke in obtaining a lease of a culm dump owned by Philadelphia & Reading
Coal & Iron Co., a company which also owns a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce. After Archbald's efforts proved unsuccessful, he later accepted a
promissory note for $500 from Warnke for making the attempt and for other
favors.
Article 6: In 1911, Archbald unlawfully, improperly, and corruptly attempted to use his
influence as a judge to induce the officers of Lehigh Valley Coal Co. to
purchase an interest in an 800-acre tract of coal land.
Article 7: In 1908, Archbald wrongfully and corruptly agreed to purchase the stock in a
gold-mining scheme in Honduras with W.W. Rissinger, who owned the Old
Plymouth Coal Co., a plaintiff in several cases pending before Archbald.
Archbald later ruled for the Old Plymouth on several legal issues, resulting in
settlements by which Old Plymouth recovered approximately $28,000.
Article 8: In 1909, Archbald drew a promissory note for $500 in his favor and had it
signed by John Henry Jones. At that time, Christopher and William Boland
owned a coal company engaged in litigation involving a large sum of money and
over which Archbald was presiding. Archbald agreed that the note, bearing his
name and indorsement, should be presented to the Bolands in an effort to get
them to discount it. This was done with the intent that Archbald's name on the
note would coerce or induce them to do so.
Article 9: In 1909 Archbald drew another promissory note in his favor for $500 and had
it signed by John Henry Jones. Knowing that his own indorsement was not
sufficient to secure money in normal commercial channels, Archbald wrongfully
permitted the indorsed note to be presented for discount at the office of C.H.
Von Storch, in whose favor Archbald had recently ruled in a lawsuit. Storch did
discount the note. The note has never been paid.
Article 10: On May 1, 1910, Archbald received a large sum of money from Henry W.
Cannon for the purpose of defraying the cost of a pleasure trip to Europe. At
that time, Cannon was a stockholder and officer of various interstate railway
companies that in due course were likely to be interested in litigation pending
in the Commerce Court and presided over by Archbald. Accepting this money
was improper and brought Archbald's office into disrepute.
Article 11: In May 1910, Archbald received more than $500 from attorneys who practiced
before him, the money having been solicited by court officers appointed by
Archbald.
Article 12: On April 9, 1901, Archbald appointed J.B. Woodward, an attorney for Lehigh
Valley Railroad Co., as jury commissioner for his district court. While serving
as jury commissioner, Woodward continued to act as attorney for the railroad,
which Archbald well knew.
Article 13: During his time as a district judge and as a judge assigned to the Commerce
Court, Archbald wrongfully sought to obtain credit from and through persons
who were interested in litigation over which he presided. He speculated for
profit in the purchase and sale of various coal properties, and unlawfully used
his position as judge to influence officers of various railroad companies to enter
into contracts in which he had a financial interest, which such companies had
litigation pending in his court.
The Senate voted as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 68 5 Article 2 46 25 Article 3 60 11 Article 4 52 20 Article 5 66 6 Article 6 24 45 Article 7 29 36 Article 8 22 42 Article 9 23 39 Article 10 1 65 Article 11 11 51 Article 12 19 46 Article 13 42 20
After the guilty verdict was announced, the Senate voted to remove Judge Archbald from
office. Then, by a vote of 39-35, it disqualified him from holding any office under the United
States in the future.
Article 1: English abused his office through tyranny and oppression, thereby bringing the
administration of justice in his court into disrepute, by (1) disbarring Thomas
Webb and later Charles A. Karch without preferring charges against either,
without prior notice to either, and without permitting either to be heard in his
own defense; (2) unlawfully and deceitfully summoning several state and local
officials to appear before him in an imaginary case, placing them in a jury box,
and then in a loud, angry voice and using profane and indecent language,
denouncing them without naming any act of misconduct and threatening to
remove them from their offices; (3) intending to coerce the minds of certain
jurymen by telling them that he would send them to jail if they did not convict
a defendant whom the judge said was guilty; (4) unlawfully summoning an
editor of the East St. Louis Journal and a reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
and in angry and abusive language threatening them with imprisonment if they
published truthful facts relating to the disbarment of Karch; and (5) unlawfully
summoning the publisher of the Carbondale Free Press and threatening to
imprison him for printing an editorial and some handbills.
Article 2: English engaged in a course of unlawful and improper conduct, "filled with
partiality and favoritism," in connection with bankruptcy cases within the
district. He did this by, among other things: (1) appointing Charles B. Thomas
as the referee for all such cases; (2) unlawfully changing the rules of bankruptcy
for the district to allow Thomas both to appoint friends and relatives as receivers
and to charge the cost of expensive office space to the United States and the
estates in bankruptcy; and (3) allowing Thomas to hire English's son at a large
compensation to be paid out of funds of the estates in bankruptcy.
Article 3: English corruptly extended partiality and favoritism, bringing the administration
of justice into disrepute, by refusing to appoint the temporary receivers
suggested by counsel for the parties in interest in a major case unless Charles
Thomas was appointed attorney for such receivers. When they agreed, he
retroactively increased the salary for Thomas, producing a total charge of
$43,350, even though Thomas' services were not necessary. English did similar
things in other cases. In a criminal case, English sentenced the convicted
defendant to four months and a $500 fine. When the defendant's counsel
withdrew and was replaced by Thomas, English vacated the sentence of
imprisonment. For this, the defendant paid Thomas $2,500. English acted on
the matter without the presence of Thomas in the court and without
investigation, in order to show favoritism to Thomas, to whom English was
under financial obligation. English then received $1,435 from Thomas in return
for the favoritism extended.
Article 4: In conjunction with Thomas, English corruptly and improperly deposited,
transferred, and used bankruptcy funds for the pecuniary benefit of himself and
Thomas.
Article 5: English repeatedly treated members of the bar in a course, indecent, arbitrary,
and tyrannical manner, so as to hinder them in their duties and deprive their
clients of the benefits of counsel. He wickedly and illegally refused to allow
parties the benefit of trial by jury. He conducted himself in making decisions
and issuing orders so as to inspire the widespread belief that matters in his court
were not decided on their merits, but with partiality and favoritism.
Judge English resigned his office on November 4, 1926. On December 11th, the House
managers of the impeachment reported that Judge English's resignation "in no way affects the
right of the Senate" to hear and determine the impeachment charges. Nevertheless, they
recommended that the impeachment proceedings against him be discontinued. The House then
passed a resolution indicating its desire not to urge the articles of impeachment before the
Senate. On December 13th, the Senate concurred by a vote of 70-9.
Article 1: Louderback abused the power of his office through tyranny, oppression,
favoritism, and conspiracy, and brought the administration of justice within the
district into disrepute. In particular, on March 11, 1930, he discharged Addison
G. Strong as receiver in a case after he attempted to coerce Strong to hire
Douglas Short as attorney for the receiver by promising to allow large fees and
threatening to reduce fees if Short were not appointed. He then appointed Short,
who had been suggested by Sam Leake, to whom Louderback was under
personal obligation. Leake had previously conspired with Louderback to rent
lodgings for Louderback in San Francisco under Leake's name, so that
Louderback could reside in San Francisco while maintaining a fictitious
residence in Contra Costa County, so that a lawsuit Louderback expected to be
filed against him could be removed to Contra Costa County. Short did receive
exorbitant fees for his services as attorney for the receiver, and Leake received
a kickback from Short.
Article 2: Louderback, filled with partiality and favoritism, improperly granted excessive
and exorbitant allowances to the receiver and attorney he had appointed in a
case over which he had improperly acquired jurisdiction. When his orders in the
case were reversed on appeal, and Louderback was directed to order the receiver
to turn the property over to the state insurance commissioner, Louderback
improperly and illegally conditioned that order on the commissioner's
agreement not to appeal the award of fees Louderback had granted to the
receiver and attorney. This allowed Louderback to favor and enrich his friends
at the expense of the litigants and parties in interest in the case.
Article 3: Louderback misbehaved in office, resulting in expense, annoyance, and
hindrance to the litigants, by appointing Guy H. Gilbert as receiver in a case,
knowing that Gilbert was incompetent and unqualified for that position. He then
refused the litigants a hearing on the appointment and caused them to be
misinformed of his actions.
Article 4: For the sole purpose of enriching his friends, Louderback appointed a receiver
on an improper application in a case involving Prudential Holding Co.
Louderback then refused to give proper consideration to Prudential's petition to
remove the receiver. When Prudential became the subject of a bankruptcy case,
Louderback improperly and illegally took jurisdiction over the case, and
appointed the receiver as receiver in bankruptcy, causing Prudential unnecessary
expense and depriving it of the right to fair and impartial consideration of its
rights.
Article 5: During his tenure as judge and in the manner in which he issued orders,
appointed receivers, and appointed attorneys for receivers, Louderback
displayed "a high degree of indifference to the litigants" and inspired the
widespread belief that matters in his court were not decided on their merits, but
with partiality and favoritism, all of which is prejudicial to the dignity of the
judiciary.
The House later amended Article 5, the cumulative charge, to make it more detailed. The Senate acquitted Judge Louderback by voting as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 34 42 Article 2 23 47 Article 3 11 63 Article 4 30 47 Article 5 45 34
Article 1: In July, 1930, Ritter awarded his former law partner an advance of $2,500 for
his services in a receivership proceeding. Ritter, aware of the appearance of
impropriety, then asked another judge in the district to fix the final fee
allowance. The other judge did so, setting the fee at $15,000. Nevertheless,
Ritter then allowed an additional $75,000. The When the amount was paid, the
former partner in turn paid Ritter $4,500 in cash, which Ritter corruptly and
unlawfully accepted for his own use and benefit.
Article 2: In 1929, Ritter conspired with his former law partner and others to place a hotel
into receivership in proceeding before Ritter. The former partner then filed the
action without authorization from and contrary to the instructions of the parties
in interest. When the matter came before Ritter, he refused the parties' request
to dismiss the action and appointed one of the other conspirators receiver. Then
follow the facts alleged in Article 1. Ritter willfully failed to perform his duty
to conserve the assets of the company in receivership. Instead, he permitted
their waste and dissipation, and personally profited thereby.
Article 3: Ritter violated the Judicial Code of the United States by continuing to work on
a case after he became a judge, and he solicited and accepted additional $2,000
in fees for such work.
Article 4: Ritter violated the Judicial Code of the United States by working on another
case after he became a judge, for which he received $7,500.
Article 5: Ritter violated federal law by willfully attempting to evade federal tax on
income earned in 1929. Specifically, he received $12,000 in unreported income,
$9,500 of which relates to matters described in Articles 3 & 4.
Article 6: Ritter violated federal law by willfully attempting to evade federal tax on
income earned in 1930. Specifically, he received $5,300 in unreported income,
$2,000 of which relates to matters described in Article 1.
Article 7: The reasonable and probable consequences of Ritter's actions was "to bring his
court into scandal and disrepute," to the prejudice of the court and public
confidence in the administration of justice therein. Specifically, in addition to
the conduct in Articles 1-6, when one of his decisions came under public
criticism, Ritter agreed to recuse himself from the case if the city commissioners
of Miami passed a resolution expressing confidence in his integrity. Ritter
thereby bartered his judicial authority for a vote of confidence.
The Senate voted on the articles of impeachment as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 55 29 Article 2 52 32 Article 3 44 39 Article 4 36 48 Article 5 36 48 Article 6 46 37 Article 7 56 28
As a result, Judge Ritter was acquitted on the first six articles, each of which charged specific
wrongdoing, and was convicted on the final, general article charging Ritter with bringing his
court into scandal and disrepute. The chair ruled that conviction carries with it removal from
office, without a further vote being necessary. The Senate then voted 76-0 not to disqualify
Ritter from holding future office.
Article 1: In June 1980, and in violation of federal law, Claiborne willfully and knowingly
filed a federal income tax return for the year 1979 that failed to report a
substantial amount of income.
Article 2: In June 1981, and in violation of federal law, Claiborne willfully and knowingly
filed a federal income tax return for the year 1980 that failed to report a
substantial amount of income.
Article 3: On August 10, 1984, Claiborne was found guilty of making and subscribing a
false income tax return for the calendar years 1979 and 1980.
Article 4: By willfully and knowingly falsifying his income on his federal tax returns for
1979 and 1980, Claiborne "betrayed the trust of the people of the United States
and reduced confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, thereby
bringing disrepute on the federal courts and the administration of justice by the
courts."
After a trial committee received the evidence, the entire Senate voted on the articles of impeachment as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 87 10 Article 2 90 7 Article 3 46 17 Article 4 89 8
Judge Claiborne was therefore convicted on counts 1, 2 and 4 but acquitted on count 3
(although more than two-thirds of those voting voted to convict, fewer than two-thirds of those
present voted to convict; see U.S. Const. Art. I, 3).
Article 1: In 1981, Hastings and William Borders, an attorney, engaged in a corrupt
conspiracy to obtain $150,000 from defendants in United States v. Romano, a
case tried before Judge Hastings, in return for the imposition of sentences which
would not require incarceration.
Article 2: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he and Borders never made any
agreement to solicit a bribe from defendants in the Romano case.
Article 3: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he and Borders never agreed to
modify the sentences of defendants in the Romano case in return for a bribe
from those defendants.
Article 4: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he and Borders never agreed that, in
return for a bribe, Hastings would modify an order he previously issued that
property of the Romano defendants be forfeited.
Article 5: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that his appearance at the Fontainebleau
Hotel on September 16, 1981 was not part of a plan to demonstrate his
participation in a bribery scheme and that he had not expected to meet Borders
there.
Article 6: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that he did not expect Borders to appear
at his room at the Sheraton Hotel on September 12, 1981.
Article 7: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that his motive for instructing his law
clerk to prepare a new forfeiture order in the Romano case was based on his
concern that the order be revised before the law clerk's scheduled departure,
when in fact the instruction was in furtherance of a bribery scheme.
Article 8: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that his October 5, 1981, telephone
conversation with Borders was about writing letters to solicit assistance for
Hemphill Pride, when in fact it was a coded conversation in furtherance of a
conspiracy with Borders to solicit a bribe from defendants in the Romano case.
Article 9: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that three documents that purported to be
drafts of letters to assist Hemphill Pride had been written by Hastings on
October 5, 1981, and were the letters referred to by Hastings in his October 5th
telephone conversation with Borders.
Article 10: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that on May 5, 1981 he talked to
Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-758-8825.
Article 11: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that on August 2, 1981, he talked to
Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-782-9387.
Article 12: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that on September 2, 1981, he talked to
Hemphill Pride by placing a telephone call to 803-758-8825.
Article 13: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that 803-777-7716 was a telephone
number through which Hemphill Pride could be contacted in July 1981.
Article 14: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly and falsely stated that on October 9, 1981, he called his
mother and Patricia Williams from his hotel room at the L'Enfant Plaza Hotel.
Article 15: In 1983, while Hastings was a defendant in a criminal case and under oath,
Hastings knowingly made a false statement concerning his motives for taking
a plane on October 9, 1981, from Baltimore-Washington International Airport
rather than from Washington National Airport.
Article 16: On September 6, 1985, Hastings revealed highly confidential information that
he learned as the judge supervising a wiretap. As a result of this improper
disclosure, certain investigations then being conducted by law enforcement
agents of the United States were thwarted and ultimately terminated.
Article 17: Hastings, through a corrupt relationship with Borders, giving false testimony
under oath, fabricating false documents, and improperly disclosing confidential
information acquired by him as the supervisory judge of a wiretap, undermined
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary and betrayed the trust
of the people of the United States, thereby bringing disrepute on the Federal
courts and the administration of justice by the Federal courts.
Prior to Senate action, Hastings had been acquitted in a criminal trial for bribery and conspiracy, but his alleged co-conspirator, Borders, had been convicted in a separate trial. During the impeachment trial, a committee of the Senate received the evidence. Prior to voting on the articles of impeachment, and with the consent of both the House managers and counsel for Judge Hastings, the entire Senate decided that if it acquitted on Article 1, no vote should be taken on Articles 2-5, 6 or 7. Instead, a judgment of acquittal on those charges should be automatically entered. The Senate then began to vote. After voting on the first six articles, the Senate decided it would be unnecessary to vote on Articles 10-15. The votes were as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 69 26 Article 2 68 27 Article 3 69 26 Article 4 67 28 Article 5 67 26 Article 6 48 47 Article 7 69 26 Article 8 68 27 Article 9 70 25 Article 16 0 95 Article 17 60 35
Judge Hastings was therefore deemed removed from office. In 1992, Hastings was elected to
and became a member of the House of Representatives. He is currently in his third term.
Article 1: On July 18, 1984, Nixon testified before a federal grand jury investigating
Nixon's business relationship with Wiley Fairchild and the handling of the
criminal prosecution of Fairchild's son for drug smuggling. In doing so, he
falsely denied having ever discussed the Fairchild case with District Attorney
Paul Holmes.
Article 2: On July 18, 1984, Nixon testified before a federal grand jury investigating
Nixon's business relationship with Wiley Fairchild and the handling of the
criminal prosecution of Fairchild's son for drug smuggling. In doing so, he
falsely asserted that he had nothing whatsoever to do with the Fairchild case and
had never influenced anybody with respect to it.
Article 3: Nixon "has raised substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity, undermined
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, betrayed the trust of
the people of the United States, disobeyed the laws of the United States and
brought disrepute on the Federal courts and the administration of justice by the
Federal courts." He did this, after entering into an investment with Wiley
Fairchild, by concealing from federal investigators and from a grand jury
conversations Nixon had with Fairchild, the District Attorney, and others about
the prosecution of Fairchild's son.
In 1986, Nixon was convicted on federal criminal charges for the conduct described in Articles 1 and 2. At the time of his impeachment trial, he had exhausted his appeals and was serving a 5-year sentence. The Senate appointed a committee to receive the evidence at trial. The whole Senate then voted on the articles of impeachment as follows:
Guilty Not Guilty Article 1 89 8 Article 2 78 19 Article 3 57 40
As a result of the conviction on Articles 1 and 2, Nixon was removed from office, without a
separate vote.
| United States Impeachments, 1789 to present | ||||
| Official | Office | Dates | Grounds | Result |
| William Blount | U.S. Senator (Tenn.) | 1798-99 | conspiracy to aid a foreign power despite official U.S. neutrality | expelled; impeachment case then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| John Pickering | Judge (D.N.H.) | 1803-04 | improper rulings, drunkenness & blasphemy | convicted and removed from office |
| Samuel Chase | Supreme Court Justice | 1804-05 | bias in charging a grand jury and delivering an inflammatory political harangue to another | acquitted |
| James H. Peck | Judge (D. Mo.) | 1830-31 | improperly holding in contempt a lawyer who had criticized his rulings | acquitted |
| West H. Humphreys | Judge (D. Tenn.) | 1862 | incitement to revolt & rebellion | convicted, removed, and disqualified from future office |
| Andrew Johnson | President | 1867-68 | violation of the Tenure of Office Act by firing Secretary of War Stanton | acquitted |
| William W. Belknap | Secretary of War | 1876 | bribery | acquitted after resignation, largely on jurisdictional grounds |
| Charles H. Swayne | Judge (N.D. Fla.) | 1903-05 | falsifying expense accounts & using property held in a receivorship | acquitted |
| Robert W. Archbald | Judge (3d Cir.) | 1912-13 | bribery & hearing cases in which he had a financial interest | convicted, removed, and disqualified from future office |
| George English | Judge (E.D. Ill.) | 1926 | habitual malperformance | no action taken by Senate after his resignation |
| Harold Louderback | Judge (N.D. Cal.) |
1932-33 |
using favoritism in appointing receivers | acquitted |
| Halstead L. Ritter | Judge (S.D. Fla.) | 1936 | taking kickbacks, tax evasion & bringing his court into scandal and disrepute | convicted only of last charge and removed from office |
| Harry Claiborne | Judge (D. Nev.) | 1986 | tax evasion | convicted after committee trial and removed from office |
| Alcee L. Hastings | Judge (S.D. Fla.) | 1988-89 | conspiracy to solicit a bribe & perjury (acquitted in criminal trial) | convicted after committee trial and removed from office |
| Walter L. Nixon | Judge (S.D. Miss.) | 1988-89 | false statements to a grand jury | convicted after committee trial and removed from office |
| Near Impeachments | ||||
| Mark W. Delahay | Judge (D. Kan.) | 1873 | questionable financial dealings | Resigned after House voted to impeach but before articles of impeachment were adopted |
| Richard M. Nixon | President | 1974 | obstruction of justice | Resigned after Judiciary Committee voted to impeach but before whole House voted |
| Robert Collins | Judge (E.D. La.) | 1993 | bribery | resigned following his criminal conviction |
| Robert P. Aguilar | Judge (N.D. Cal.) | 1996 | obstruction of justice | retired with full pension as part of a deal to avoid impeachment |