Stephen B. Bright is Director of the Southern Center for Human Rights in Atlanta, GA. An NACDL Director, he has served people facing the death penalty at trials, on appeals and in post-conviction proceedings since 1979. He has taught courses on capital punishment, criminal procedure and international human rights at Yale, Harvard, Georgetown, Northeastern, Florida State, Emory, and St. Mary's law schools; and has testified extensively before the U.S. Congress and many state legislatures.
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. . . . [L]awyers in criminal cases are necessities, not luxuries.
Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
It will be an enormous task to bring to life the dream of Gideon v. Wainwright -- the dream of a vast, diverse country in which every person charged with a crime will be capably defended, no matter what his economic circumstances, and in which the lawyer representing him will do so proudly, without resentment at an unfair burden, sure of the support needed to make an adequate defense.
Anthony Lewis,
Gideon's Trumpet 205 (1964).
And I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep.Robert Frost,
The Road Not Taken
Thirty-five years ago, when Justice Hugo Black announced the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,1 it was surely anticipated that legislatures, courts, and bar associations would respond by taking on the enormous task of making the constitutional command of Gideon a reality. For the most part, that has not happened.A few efforts were made to bring the dream of Gideon to life. Florida, the state that opposed Clarence Earl Gideon's right to a lawyer, set up a public defender system parallel to the prosecutor's office in each of the state's judicial circuits. The Attorney General of the United States, Robert F. Kennedy, helped secure passage of the federal Criminal Justice Act to help provide representation in the federal courts.
But elsewhere there was and continues to be great resistance -- or simply indifference -- to the call of Gideon's trumpet.
For example, the Georgia District Attorneys Association responded to a bill introduced in the legislature in 1974 for statewide funding of indigent defense by telling lawmakers that it was "the greatest threat to the proper enforcement of the criminal laws of this state ever presented."2 The vehement opposition of Georgia's judges and prosecutors delayed any state funding for years and has prevented the establishment of a comprehensive indigent defense system to this day.
For the most part, state and local governments have been concerned chiefly with the cost, not the quality of the defense or the fairness of trials. In such places, lawyers appointed to defend indigents are paid only token amounts and are routinely denied necessary expert and investigative assistance. Many jurisdictions have been unwilling to establish public defender programs or have created programs but so underfunded them that caseloads are staggering.
Increasingly, officials award contracts for the defense of indigents to the lowest bidder. Some jurisdictions do not provide a lawyer to poor people who are jailed for minor offenses, despite the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Argensinger v. Hamlin3 requiring the appointment of counsel for such defendants.
For too many poor people accused of a crime, the right to counsel remains illusory and unenforceable.
Still, the promise of Gideon has been realized in some places and in some cases because of the dedication of talented and committed defense attorneys who, despite many obstacles, proudly and capably defend poor people.
Attorneys committed to the realization of Gideon have also been instrumental in creating and obtaining funding for good public defender and panel programs in some jurisdictions. These programs secure capable lawyers and provide those lawyers with training and supervision, adequate compensation, and investigative and expert assistance. The programs serve as models for the day when other jurisdictions -- either out of a belated awakening to their constitutional responsibilities or because of shame at the quality of justice in their courts -- decide to implement Gideon.
Now, though, many of these programs are under siege. Not only has funding not kept pace with increasing caseloads, in some jurisdictions it has been cut. Dependence on government funding, which is often inadequate, and lack of independence from the judicial and executive branches may interfere with the ability of public defenders or panel attorneys to act in their clients' best interest.
Heroic Efforts
Many criminal defense attorneys have shown extraordinary courage, dedication, and persistence in their efforts to bring the dream of Gideon to life.While trying to provide representation to poor defendants in the 1970s, Millard Farmer was once physically attacked by a sheriff and deputy sheriff, and jailed for contempt another time when he insisted that a south Georgia judge refrain from referring to his African American client by his first name. Undeterred, Farmer, Joe Nursey and others at the Team Defense Project provided free representation to scores of people facing the death penalty and taught a generation of lawyers how to defend capital cases.
Daniel T. Taylor, a private lawyer in Kentucky who defended the poor and dispossessed, was held in contempt and sentenced to four and a half years in prison in 1971 for his vigorous defense of an African American charged with killing a police officer. He successfully appealed his contempt citation to the U.S. Supreme Court4 and has continued to zealously defend persons accused of crimes.
Lynne Y. Borsuk, a public defender in Atlanta, withstood a firestorm of abuse from a judge in 1990 after she moved to limit her caseload, which numbered 122, so that she could responsibly represent her clients. In the first nine months of 1990, Borsuk represented almost 600 people. The controversy that arose from her stand led to increased funding and staff for Atlanta's public defender office.
Rick Teissier, a public defender in New Orleans, challenged the Louisiana indigent defense system after representing 418 defendants during the first seven months of 1991. Teissier had at least one serious case set for trial on every trial date during that period. He got no investigative support in "routine cases," because the three investigators in the public defender office were responsible for more than 7000 cases per year. No funds were available for expert witnesses.
Teissier's challenge resulted in a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court, recognizing that the clients served by this system were "not provided with the effective assistance of counsel the Constitution requires." As a result, the court decreed, prosecutions could not go forward in cases where effective assistance was not provided.5 Although problems remain, the Louisiana legislature was forced to appropriate funds for indigent defense.
There are many other heroes -- far too numerous to mention. There are also state and federal public defenders and court-appointed lawyers whose commitment and talents have made Gideon a reality for countless individuals. Many criminal defense lawyers have delivered on the promise of Gideon in difficult circumstances, often without necessary investigative and expert assistance, working long hours under the burden of overwhelming caseloads and the immense pressure of being responsible for the lives and liberty of too many fellow human beings.
These heroes in the struggle to achieve equal justice have endured the hostility of judges, prosecutors and segments of the public who either do not understand or have not accepted the concept of an adversary system, much less the vital role of the defense lawyer within that system.
Many attorneys have undertaken these missions with little or no compensation. Their applications for modest payment for their services have been arbitrarily reduced and unconscionably delayed by judges and bureaucrats.
Yet, despite these obstacles, they have carried on, day after day, year after year, providing a zealous defense for some of the poorest and least powerful people in our society. On this thirty-fifth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, we should celebrate their extraordinary contributions to the pursuit of equal justice.
Promises Kept . . . Promises Broken
The promise of Gideon has been realized in a number of jurisdictions, such as Mendocino County, California, which provides defense services for a population of 85,000 through the combination of a public defender office funded at $900,000 and a panel program funded at $1,000,000. The public defender office, which includes ten experienced criminal defense attorneys on its staff of sixteen, conducts regular training programs.Unfortunately, there are far more jurisdictions like McDuffie County, Georgia, where the county commission decided in 1993 that the $46,000 it had been spending on indigent defense was too much. The county commissioners announced they would accept bids from any member of the local bar to handle the county's indigent defense. The commissioners specified no qualifications and established no mechanism for judging the qualifications of those who submitted bids. The only goal was to save money.
In the end, they awarded a contract for the county's indigent defense work to Bill Wheeler, whose $25,000 bid was the lowest submitted. Besides being responsible for representing all of the indigent defendants in the county, Wheeler maintains a private practice as well.
Hiring Bill Wheeler saved McDuffie County $21,000, but dearly cost poor people and the cause of justice. Between 1993 and 1996, the first three years that he had the contract, Wheeler tried only one felony case to a jury while entering 213 guilty pleas in felony cases. Most remarkably, he filed only three motions in the three years.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) issued a report last October finding that such low-bid contracting, designed to "process the maximum number of defendants at the lowest cost -- without regard to truth, justice or innocence" was violating citizens' rights and leading to wrongful convictions.
When New York re-enacted the death penalty in 1995, it followed the example of Colorado and a few other states which have created and funded a capital defender program. New York's Capital Defender Office, funded this year at $4,901,400, employs 19 trial attorneys and 13 investigators and mitigation specialists. Beyond representing clients, the Capital Defender Office has conducted training programs to prepare New York lawyers for the defense of capital cases.
New York also uses members of the private bar in the defense of capital cases. The New York Court of Appeals has set payment for lead counsel in capital cases at $175 an hour and for associate counsel at $150 per hour. It has also provided for payment of experts, investigators, and social workers necessary to defend capital cases properly in hope of insuring that those facing the state's death penalty are capably defended.
The result is what New York Attorney General Dennis Vacco has described as a "cadre of highly skilled and dedicated lawyers who tenaciously represent individuals" facing the death penalty, consistent with Gideon.
In stark contrast, Alabama limits compensation to court-appointed lawyers for out-of-court preparation, for any type of case, to $20 per hour. There is a limit of $2000 in capital cases and $1000 in non-capital cases, and of $40 an hour for time spent in court.6
These figures speak volumes about the lack of commitment of Alabama's legislature to implementing Gideon. The court-appointed lawyer in Alabama who spends the time required to prepare properly for a capital trial, or many other serious cases, may earn less than the minimum wage. A lawyer can make more money flipping hamburgers at a fast food restaurant than defending a capital case that takes several hundred hours of preparation.
Not surprisingly, some poor people accused of crimes in Alabama have been represented by lawyers who were intoxicated, who were ignorant of the law, who failed to present critical evidence in mitigation at capital trials, and who were inept in other ways. In one capital case, a court-appointed attorney filed a one-page brief in the Alabama Supreme Court and did not show up for oral argument.7
Alabama is hardly alone in its complete disregard of Gideon. The National Law Journal, after an extensive study of capital cases in six states, found that capital trials are "more like a random flip of the coin than a delicate balancing of the scales" because the defense lawyer is too often "ill trained, unprepared . . . [and] grossly underpaid."8
The promise of Gideon was realized in the case of Susan Smith, who faced the death penalty for killing her children. Smith was represented by two court-appointed lawyers, David Bruck and former NACDL President Judy Clarke. Bruck and Clarke persuaded the jury not to sentence Smith to death. After the trial, the South Carolina legislature -- dismayed that Clarke had come from Spokane,Washington to provide an effective defense for Susan Smith -- enacted a law prohibiting the appointment of out-of-state attorneys to represent indigents.
Unfortunately, most of those facing the death penalty in South Carolina and throughout the rest of the country do not have the good fortune to be represented by lawyers with the skill, experience, and commitment of David Bruck and Judy Clarke. Far too many are represented by lawyers who lack the knowledge and resources needed to handle a capital case.
Calvin Burdine and Carl Johnson were represented at their capital trials in Houston by the same court-appointed attorney, who slept during parts of their trials. In Burdine's case, the clerk of the court testified that "defense counsel was asleep on several occasions on several days over the course of the proceedings." The lawyer's file on the case contained only three pages of notes. Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that a sleeping attorney was sufficient "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment.9
Both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Carl Johnson was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel even though the lawyer slept through much of the trial and, as one observer noted, "the ineptitude of the lawyer . . . jumps off the printed page."10 Neither court published its opinion. Carl Johnson was executed on September 19, 1995.
The unpublished decisions allowing the execution of Carl Johnson is a sad testament to the courts' lack of commitment to implementing Gideon.
Most Fundamental Right, Unenforceable
The right to counsel is clearly recognized as the most fundamental constitutional right. An attorney is needed to protect the client's rights and to marshal the evidence necessary for a fair and reliable determination of guilt or innocence. If the client is found guilty, an attorney is needed to assure a proper sentence. But who asserts the right to counsel?The lawyer who submits the lowest bid for a county's indigent defense business is not necessarily capable of defending criminal cases. In courts where lawyers are appointed by judges, it is no secret that judges do not always appoint the best and brightest to defend the poor. In part, this is because judges do not want to impose on those members of the profession who have more financially lucrative things to do. Many judges also appoint lawyers who try cases rapidly, instead of zealously, to move their dockets.
The indigent defendant represented by an incapable lawyer may not even know he has a right to something better than the lowest bidder, the lawyer who takes the "greased lightning" approach to handling cases, or a lawyer who is so undercompensated, so overworked, or so incompetent that adequate representation cannot be provided.
Even those who recognize that their lawyers are not adequate may not complain out of fear that the quality of the representation will deteriorate if they complain. There is the equally valid fear that the next lawyer appointed by the same judge may be worse than the first.
The difficulty of enforcing the right to counsel is illustrated by the plight of an African American man, Gregory Wilson, who faced the death penalty in Covington, Kentucky. The judge presiding over the case had difficulty finding a lawyer for Wilson, because a state statute limited compensation for defense counsel in capital cases to $2500.
When the head of the local indigent defense program suggested to the judge that more compensation was necessary to obtain a lawyer qualified for such a serious case, the judge suggested that the indigent defense program rent a river boat and sponsor a cruise down the Ohio river to raise money for the defense.
The judge eventually obtained counsel by posting a notice in the courthouse asking any member of the bar to take the case with the plea "PLEASE HELP. DESPERATE." The notice said nothing about qualifications to handle a capital case. The judge appointed the two lawyers who responded.
This method of selecting counsel did not produce a "dream team." The lead counsel can charitably be described as well past his prime. The telephone number he gave Wilson was for a bar called "Kelly's Keg." The lawyer did not have an office, but practiced out of his home, where a Budweiser beer sign was visible. The police had recently pried up the boards in his living room floor and recovered stolen property. The other lawyer, who had volunteered to assist lead counsel, had no felony trial experience.
Wilson, realizing his lawyers were not up to the task of defending a capital murder case, repeatedly objected to being represented by them. He repeatedly asked the judge that he be provided with a lawyer who was capable of defending a capital case.
The judge refused and went on to conduct a trial that was a travesty of justice. Lead counsel was not even present for much of the trial. He cross-examined only a few witnesses, including one witness whose direct testimony he missed because he was out of the courtroom. Wilson was sentenced to death.
What more could Gregory Wilson do to enforce his Sixth Amendment right to counsel? He objected. He complained about the lawyers appointed by the judge, who were clearly incapable of defending a capital case. He asked for a real lawyer. But even these efforts were insufficient to enforce the right to counsel.
Supposedly, the right to counsel can be protected after the defendant has received ineffective assistance and been convicted. The defendant, perhaps an innocent person whose life may have been destroyed by the ordeal of trial and jail, can assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. But the Catch-22 for most poor people is that they cannot prove an ineffectiveness claim without a competent lawyer.
The United States Supreme Court has held that indigents are not entitled to a lawyer for state post-conviction proceedings where claims of ineffective assistance are often raised.11 Even if the defendant is provided a lawyer to raise a claim of ineffectiveness, the court that failed to provide competent counsel at trial is unlikely to provide any more competent counsel for post-conviction proceedings.
Exzavious Gibson -- a man with an I.Q. of less than 80 -- who was condemned to die by Georgia, had no lawyer in the state post-conviction proceedings and was unable on his own to challenge the effectiveness of his court-appointed lawyer. Gibson's evidentiary hearing started as follows:
The Court: Okay. Mr. Gibson, do you want to proceed?
Gibson: I don't have an attorney.
The Court: I understand that.
Gibson: I am not waiving my rights.The Court: I understand that. Do you have any evidence you want to put up?
Gibson: I don't know what to plead.
The Court: Huh?
Gibson: I don't know what to plead.
The Court: I am not asking you to plead anything. I am just asking you if you have anything you want to put up, anything you want to introduce to this court.
Gibson: But I don't have an attorney.12Nevertheless, the court went ahead with the hearing. The state was represented by an assistant attorney general who specialized in capital habeas corpus cases. After his former attorney had been called as a witness against him, Gibson was asked if he wanted to conduct the cross-examination:
The Court: Mr. Gibson, would you like to ask Mr. Mullis any questions?
Gibson: I don't have any counsel.
The Court: I understand that, but I am asking, can you tell me yes or no whether you want to ask him any questions or not?
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel.
The Court: I'm sorry, sir, I didn't understand you.
Gibson: I'm not my own counsel.
The Court: I understand, but do you want, do you, individually, want to ask him anything?
Gibson: I don't know.
The Court: Okay, sir. Okay, thank you, Mr. Mullis, you can go down.13
Gibson tendered no evidence, examined no witnesses, and made no objections. The judge denied Gibson relief by signing an order prepared by the attorney general's office without making a single change.
Unlike Georgia, a few states provide inmates with representation in post-conviction proceedings although the Constitution does not require that they do so. Some inmates are fortunate to be represented by capable lawyers pro bono. But most poor people convicted of crimes in state criminal courts lack any access to lawyers to file post-conviction petitions challenging the effectiveness of the representation they received. For them, there is simply no remedy for the denial of their most fundamental right.
Even those who obtain new, competent counsel to bring claims of ineffective assistance may not receive relief because of the standard established by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,14 which is so low that it makes a mockery of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Judge Alvin Rubin of the Fifth Circuit put it bluntly:
The Constitution, as interpreted by the courts, does not require that the accused, even in a capital case, be represented by able or effective counsel . . . . Consequently, accused persons who are represented by "not-legally-ineffective" lawyers may be condemned to die when the same accused, if represented by effective counsel, would receive at least the clemency of a life sentence.15
There is ample support for this frank admission that Gideon's promise of equal justice to rich and poor cannot be enforced under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington.16
New Attacks and Challenges
Harold Clarke, then Chief Justice of Georgia, aptly described the approach of not only Georgia, but many states in responding to the call of Gideon:
[W]e set our sights on the embarrassing target of mediocrity. I guess that means about halfway. That raises a question. Are we willing to put up with halfway justice? To my way of thinking, one-half justice must mean one-half injustice, and one-half injustice is no justice at all.17
Although there is still so far to go to meet the promise of Gideon, the right of indigent defendants to a zealous defense is increasingly coming under attack as politicians wage the "War on Crime," going to any length to show how tough they are on crime.
Indigent defense programs are vulnerable to such attacks because the politicians making them often control funding and even the appointment of personnel for the indigent defense programs. Governors who have run on platforms of more executions and locking up more people are hostile to indigent defense. They appoint the state defenders who are supposed to defend the very people the governor has promised to kill or imprison.
Paul Patton, for example, upon becoming the governor of Kentucky, signed five execution warrants his second day in office to show that he was tough on crime. The Public Advocate, Allison Connelly, noted the inappropriateness of signing the warrants because the cases of all five of the condemned were pending before courts. Lawyers from her office secured stays of execution.
But the same governor who signed the death warrants appoints the public defender. When the time came to renew Connelly's appointment, Patton refused to reappoint her, although the Public Advocacy Commission unanimously recommended her reappointment and judges and lawyers praised the job she had done.
Politicians can also use the purse strings to undermine Gideon. In Pittsburgh, funds and job positions at the public defender office were slashed in 1995. The office is now operating with 45 lawyers, 12 less than the 57 who were there previously. Eight full-time investigators were also fired. The attorneys earn between $24,000 and $32,000 and are permitted to have a part-time legal practice.
A study by the Spangenberg Group concluded that the Pittsburgh office was grossly under-funded, its office space cramped and inadequate, and its budget significantly less than those for defender offices in other counties of its size. The county commissioners responded to the study by cutting $1 million from the $3.9 million budget.
In Wisconsin, Governor Tommy Thompson proposed cuts to the state public defender's budget, more flat rate payments to appointed counsel, and limits on how much public defenders and appointed attorneys can spend on court documents and investigative services. When the 1995-97 budget ultimately was passed, $3.85 million was cut from the allocation for indigent defense.
Underfunding is the rule, not the exception, with regard to indigent defense programs throughout the nation. Each new crime bill -- state and federal -- includes appropriations of more money for law enforcement and prosecutors, producing more arrests and prosecutions. But funding for indigent defense, already inadequate, does not keep pace and the system becomes even more out of balance.
New ways are being conjured up to discourage defendants from exercising their right to counsel. At least 15 states now require indigent defendants to pay an up-front fee to be assigned counsel. New Jersey has set the highest fee at $200. In some jurisdictions, defendants in misdemeanor cases are told to visit with the prosecutor and attempt plea negotiations and, if unsuccessful, then report to the public defender office.
Promises To Keep
The criminal defense bar must provide the leadership to stop the deteriorating state of indigent defense and turn America back toward the realization of Gideon's promise.No one else is going to do it. Unless pushed, legislatures are unwilling to pay the price for adequate representation, most courts are unwilling to order it, and many bar associations appear to have conceded defeat after writing numerous reports on the sad state of indigent defense that have been ignored.
However, a number of new initiatives are being launched, many by NACDL, to renew the commitment to Gideon. NACDL has issued a report on the denial of the right to counsel resulting from fixed-price contracts for providing representation. The report calls upon bar disciplinary boards to scrutinize low-bid contracts and enforce the Rules of Professional Responsibility. The report was sent to 255 state and local bar presidents, chief justices and lawyer disciplinary bodies.
A number of systemic challenges to inadequate indigent defense systems have been filed and others are being prepared. A class action challenge to inadequacies in Connecticut's public defender system has survived a motion to dismiss.18 An action is pending against the commissioners in Pittsburgh for the problems resulting from severe budget cuts there.
Legislative efforts, though difficult, are immensely important because legislatures establish both the structure and the funding for indigent defense programs. On occasion, these efforts are bearing fruit. Arkansas adopted a statewide, state-funded full-time public defender system which started this year. A bill to create a statewide defender system in Mississippi passed the Senate in 1997, but was blocked by one committee in the House.
Criminal defense lawyers have been instrumental in urging those in the executive branch to add their voices and power to efforts to obtain adequate funding for indigent defense programs to see that justice is done and that the adversarial system works.
During her term as NACDL President, Judy Clarke initiated a dialogue with Attorney General Janet Reno about the state of indigent defense. The Attorney General called for "adequate funding, adequate training and adequate resources for indigent defendants" in a speech before the American Bar Association in 1997. She has convened several meetings with representatives from NACDL and other organizations to find ways to achieve some balance in the system.
A widely noticed article jointly authored by NACDL President Gerald Lefcourt, National District Attorneys Association President William Murphy, and ABA Criminal Justice Section Chair Ronald Goldstock recently argued that "adequate funding for indigent defense services at the federal, state and local levels is, without question, essential to the fair administration of criminal justice."19
As these efforts are made for adequate funding, structure and independence, those heroes described earlier -- the talented criminal defense lawyers who put the quest for justice before the pursuit of money, laboring in the trenches defending the poor day after day -- will continue to deliver on the promise of Gideon by proudly and capably defending those whose lives and liberty are at stake.
Those lawyers are aggressively litigating the right to adequate compensation, to the funds necessary to investigate, and for the experts needed to prepare and present a defense. They continue to bear witness to the deficiencies of the system in hope that it will prompt legislatures and courts to take their eyes off the embarrassing target of mediocrity and take aim at a full measure of justice for all citizens.
Thanks to these lawyers, some innocent people will avoid wrongful conviction; some troubled youths will be diverted to drug, alcohol, mental health, job training and other programs; and others accused will receive professional advice, guidance and zealous advocacy through what is to them the strange and foreign land of the criminal justice system. For those accused who are fortunate to be represented by these lawyers, the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright will be kept.
Notes
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).2. Mike Mears, A Brief History of the Georgia Indigent Defense Act 24 (1996).
3. Argensinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
4. Taylor v Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
5. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 790 (La. 1993).
6. Ala. Code 15-12-21 (a) (Supp. 1992).
7. See Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale Law Journal 1835 (1994).
8. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death Belt, Nat. L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30, 30-44.
9. Ex parte Burdine, 901 S.W.2d 456 (Tx. Crim. App. 1995).
10. David Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. Rev. 691, 694 (1996).
11. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). The Court has held that even in capital cases, there is no right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
12. Gibson v. Turpin, Super. Ct. of Butts Co., Ga., No. 95-V-648, Transcript of hearing of Sept. 12, 1996, at 2-3.
13. Id. at 67.
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. Riles v. McCotter, 799 F.2d 947, 955 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring).
16. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 91 (1995).
17. Chief Justice Harold G. Clarke, Annual State of the Judiciary Address, reprinted in Fulton County Daily Rep., Jan. 14, 1993, at 5.
18. Rivera v. Rowland, see The Champion (March 1995) for a description of the case.
19. Gerald Lefcourt, et al., Justice That Makes Sense, The Champion, (December 1997) at 6.